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THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN 
ENERGY MARKETS AND THE PROBLEM  
OF MARKET POWER 
David B. Spence* 
Robert Prentice** 
Abstract: Traditionally, American energy markets have been regulated us-
ing a combination of antitrust law and public utility law: the former has 
predominated in oil markets and the latter in markets for natural gas and 
electricity. Over time, energy markets have grown increasingly complex 
and competitive, due partly to changing market conditions (for example, 
in oil markets) and partly to regulation (in natural gas and electricity 
markets). Increasingly competitive energy markets meant increased risk 
for energy companies; those companies turned to energy derivatives as a 
way to hedge that risk. High energy prices and charges of manipulation in 
twenty-first century energy markets have led regulators to a new ap-
proach, one that borrows from securities regulation and focuses attention 
on “manipulation and deceit” by energy market participants. The securi-
ties model may be a bad fit for energy markets, however, because reliance 
on this new approach exposes consumers to price risks associated with the 
exercise of market power by sellers, risks to which buyers were not subject 
under traditional approaches to regulation. Specifically, the securities 
regulation model overlooks important ways in which sellers can exert 
market power at the expense of consumers in the absence of fraud or de-
ceit. This is due to the way securities case law interprets the term “ma-
nipulation,” and to some regulators’ common assumptions about the ways 
in which market participants respond to price changes—assumptions that 
do not apply or apply only weakly in some energy markets. In this Article, 
we explore the origins of these “bad fit” problems, and examine their im-
plications for the future of American energy markets. 
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Introduction 
 Institutions shape markets,1 and that has certainly been true of 
energy markets. Throughout most of their history, American energy 
markets have been regulated using a combination of antitrust law and 
public utility law: the former has predominated in oil markets and the 
latter in markets for natural gas and electricity. Each of these ap-
proaches is aimed at preventing abuses of market power and other 
forms of unfair competition in energy markets. Antitrust regulation 
relies primarily on ex post enforcement to punish unfair competition 
after it occurs, hoping that punishment will deter future anticompeti-
tive behavior; whereas traditional public utility regulation relies on ex 
ante regulation, controlling the terms and conditions of competition in 
natural gas and electricity markets from the outset.2 As energy markets 
have grown increasingly complex and competitive, these traditional 
approaches have been supplemented and partly supplanted by a new 
approach—one that uses a model of regulation borrowed from securi-
ties law; that model is focused less on controlling market power and 
more on market manipulation based upon fraud and deceit. 
 We argue that this new approach increases consumers’ exposure to 
price risks associated with the exercise of market power. Part I of this 
Article recounts the development and evolution of the traditional en-
ergy regulatory regime during the twentieth century, examining the 
management of competition in oil markets using antitrust law sepa-
rately from that of natural gas and electricity markets using public util-
ity law.3 This Part concludes by documenting the rise of competition in 
late twentieth-century energy markets, owing to the declining influence 
of so-called “western oil majors” in oil markets and the regulatory re-
structuring of natural gas and electricity markets. Part II examines the 
implications of these changes that eventually led regulators to trans-
plant the securities regulation model into energy markets in a series of 
legislative and regulatory developments over the last five years.4 We 
note here that increasingly competitive energy markets meant increased 
                                                                                                                      
1 This is a founding premise of institutional economics, or the market-institutional 
perspective within economics. The idea is that markets are embedded in a particular so-
cial, political, and legal context that shapes market behavior. For a good treatment of this 
perspective, see generally The Political Economy Reader: Markets as Institutions 
(Naazneen H. Barma & Steven K. Vogel eds., 2008). 
2 The Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) merger approval process, a form of ex ante 
control, is an exception to this general statement. 
3 See infra notes 8–95 and accompanying text. 
4 See infra notes 96–238 and accompanying text. 
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risk for energy companies, which turned to energy derivatives5 as a way 
to hedge that risk. The last decade has seen increasingly active and ro-
bust markets for both the physical delivery of energy and energy deriva-
tives. Regulators, cognizant of the possibility that sophisticated energy 
traders might be able to manipulate prices in these markets at consum-
ers’ expense, looked to securities regulation for ways to regulate that 
risk. Part III examines the limits of this securities regulation model in 
energy markets.6 We argue that, by focusing on fraud and deceit, the 
securities regulation model misses ways in which sellers of energy in 
physical markets can exercise market power at the expense of buyers, 
even in the absence of fraudulent or deceptive conduct. We argue fur-
ther that regulators exacerbate this problem by employing some erro-
neous assumptions about the self-correcting nature of energy mar-
kets—assumptions that have led regulators to tolerate scarcity-induced 
high prices for extended periods of time, particularly in electricity 
markets. Finally, we offer some concluding thoughts and brief observa-
tions about the future trajectory of energy regulation.7 
I. The Evolution of Regulation in American Energy Markets 
 From their beginnings, oil, gas, and electricity markets in the Unit-
ed States provoked public concern about the vulnerability of consumers 
to the machinations and manipulations of powerful producers, trans-
porters, and sellers of energy. Commercial development of oil and natu-
ral gas8 arose in the mid and late nineteenth century.9 Both products 
almost immediately enjoyed wide use in heating, lighting, and industrial 
applications. The development of electricity as a commercial product 
                                                                                                                      
5 In this context, the term “derivatives” refers to a class of financial instruments or 
contracts that are derived from markets for the physical delivery of energy. Energy futures 
contracts are an example of an energy derivative. These derivatives are explained more 
fully. See infra notes 100–123 and accompanying text. 
6 See infra notes 239–360 and accompanying text. 
7 See infra notes 361–363 and accompanying text. 
8 In its early years, the natural gas (methane extracted from underground deposits) 
industry competed with gas manufactured from coal (so-called “coal gas”), which was wide-
ly used in lighting applications in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Eventually, 
electricity supplanted gas as a source of lighting, but natural gas continued to thrive as a 
source of energy for industry and, eventually, home heating and cooking. See Maury 
Klein, The Power Makers: Steam, Electricity, and the Men Who Invented Modern 
America 140–42 (2008). 
9 The first natural gas well was drilled near Fredonia, New York, in what is now called the 
Marcellus Shale. See Eileen Lash & Gary Lash, The Early History of Natural Gas: “Kicking Down 
the Well,” The SUNY Fredonia Shale Research Institute, http://www.fredonia.edu/shale 
institute/history.asp (last visited Nov. 20, 2011). 
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lagged a few decades behind, but quickly penetrated the lighting, 
household appliance, and industrial applications markets in urban areas 
during the early decades of the twentieth century.10 Policymakers and 
regulators have always recognized the critical importance of energy to 
consumers, and their central task has been to balance the desire to har-
ness the benefits of competition with the risks unbridled markets pose 
to vulnerable consumers. These concerns produced two different regu-
latory responses, both aimed at ensuring an adequate supply of energy 
at reasonable prices. In oil markets, regulators relied primarily on anti-
trust law as a tool of ex post control, using lawsuits to punish the exer-
cise of market power and push markets toward greater competition.11 In 
electric and gas markets, by contrast, government regulators chose the 
public utility model, a form of ex ante regulatory control. That model 
accepted the absence of competition on the premise that these network 
industries were natural monopolies,12 granting to electric and gas com-
panies monopoly service rights. In exchange, electric and gas compa-
nies ceded control over their rates and certain other terms of electric 
and gas services.13 
A. Oil Markets, Antitrust, and the Ex Post Control of Market Power 
 It was not long after “Colonel” Edwin Drake discovered oil in West-
ern Pennsylvania that John D. Rockefeller established the Standard Oil 
Company in Cleveland, Ohio.14 For most of the rest of the nineteenth 
century, the Pennsylvania “oil patch” produced the lion’s share of oil in 
the United States and, by the later part of that century, Rockefeller had 
positioned Standard Oil to become the dominant refiner and retailer of 
that oil. Much of Standard Oil’s growth and success was attributable to 
Rockefeller’s business acumen: strategic sense, attention to detail, scru-
                                                                                                                      
10 For a comprehensive description of the early days of electric power, see Klein, supra 
note 8, at 98–117. 
11 Indeed, popular revulsion at (anti)competitive practices in the oil industry helped 
shape the content of antitrust statutes, and those statutes were applied to the oil industry 
in several high-profile twentieth-century cases. See infra notes 20–46 and accompanying 
text. 
12 Generally, economists define a natural monopoly as an industry (or discrete seg-
ment of an industry) over which the costs of production are increasing over the entire 
range of output. Hal R. Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics: A Modern Approach 
451–58 (8th ed. 2010). 
13 For a summary history of rate regulation, see Robert E. Cleaves, IV, Constitutional 
Protection for the Utility Investor: The Confiscation Doctrine After Cleveland Electric Illuminating 
Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 12 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 527, 533–34 
(1985). 
14 See Ron Chernow, Titan: The Life of John D. Rockefeller, Sr. 129–55 (1998). 
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pulous control of costs, technical ingenuity, and willingness to integrate 
in order to control costs and supplies.15 The company’s success was also 
built, however, on Rockefeller’s sharp-elbowed approach to competi-
tion, including price-fixing arrangements by Standard Oil subsidiaries 
and affiliates, management of pipelines to benefit affiliated shippers, 
and a briefly successful but ill-conceived “South Improvement Scheme”
—a plan to force railroads to tax competitors’ oil shipments and transfer 
the revenue from that tax to Standard Oil.16 Like many of the industrial-
ists of his day, Rockefeller believed that by absorbing or destroying 
weaker companies he was providing a social benefit: not the “creative 
destruction”17 that was hailed as the key to competitive prices for con-
sumers, but rather the kind of market stability that only a benevolent 
monopolist can provide.18 To Rockefeller, the kind of competition the 
neoclassical economic model envisioned wreaked havoc on families and 
communities; indeed, he described competition as “destructive” and “a 
sin.”19 
 Most of the public saw things differently. Public opposition to 
Rockefeller’s Standard Oil “trust” and other large holding companies 
gave rise to the antitrust movement,20 whose first major legislative ac-
complishment was the Sherman Act of 189021 prohibiting “combina-
tion[s] . . . in restraint of trade” and “attempt[s] to monopolize.”22 
When several exposés of Standard Oil’s (anti)competitive practices ap-
peared in McClure’s Magazine between 1902 and 1904,23 it set the stage 
for federal antitrust prosecution of Standard Oil. In 1911, in Standard 
Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
Standard Oil was indeed a monopoly and combination in restraint of 
trade.24 The Court reaffirmed the goal of fostering competitive markets 
                                                                                                                      
15 For a detailed account of this growth, see id. at 129–72. 
16 For a description of the scheme, see id. at 135–42. See also Daniel Yergin, The 
Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power 41 (1992). 
17 See Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy 81–86 (6th 
ed. 1987). 
18 See Chernow, supra note 14, at 168; Yergin, supra note 16, at 42–43. 
19 See Chernow, supra note 14, at 144. 
20 See id. at 537–59; Yergin, supra note 16, at 81–98. 
21 Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006)). 
22 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2. 
23 See, e.g., Ida M. Tarbell, The History of the Standard Oil Company: Chapter I—The Birth of 
an Industry, 20 McClure’s Mag., Nov. 1902, at 3, 3. The articles became a best-selling 
book. See generally Ida Tarbell, The Story of Standard Oil (David M. Chalmers ed., 
Harper & Row 1966) (1904) (presenting a detailed narrative of the history of Standard 
Oil). 
24 221 U.S. 1, 81–82 (1911). 
136 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:131 
by controlling the misuse of market power and ordered Standard Oil’s 
dissolution into thirty-four separate production companies.25 Thus, an-
titrust law became the weapon of choice in combating market power 
abuses in the oil industry. Indeed, the public hearings that led to the 
passage of the Clayton Act26 and the Federal Trade Commission Act27 
in 1914 featured a dissection of Standard Oil’s anticompetitive prac-
tices, many of which were subsequently defined as violations of the law 
within those two statutes.28 
 Meanwhile, the competitive landscape of the oil industry was 
changing in other ways. Oil production in the United States had begun 
to expand to new regions, particularly Texas, Oklahoma, and Louisi-
ana, where several large oilfields were discovered near the turn of the 
century. The need to transport oil from fields to market gave rise to the 
construction of the first system of oil pipelines, and the Hepburn Act of 
190629 subjected pipelines to price regulation by the Interstate Com-
merce Commission (ICC) as common carriers.30 As each new field was 
discovered, the oil industry experienced a series of boom-and-bust cy-
cles, accompanied by wild swings in oil prices—the very sort of destruc-
tive competition Rockefeller lamented. These cycles were encouraged 
by the common law “rule of capture,” which permitted any single 
owner of mineral rights in a multi-owner oilfield to produce as much 
oil as possible from the field.31 In addition to its effects on prices, the 
rule of capture led to tremendous waste because it provided a disincen-
tive for owners to manage production (for example, by coordinating 
both the placement of wells and production rates from those wells) so 
as to maintain pressure levels in the field. The result was production 
                                                                                                                      
25 Id. 
26 Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (2006) and 
29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53 (2006)). 
27 Ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41, 58). 
28 See Chernow, supra note 14, at 617. 
29 Ch. 3591, 34 Stat. 584 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C. 
(2006)). 
30 The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) now sets rates for interstate oil 
pipelines because the ICC was abolished in 1995. ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. 
No. 104-88, § 101, 109 Stat. 803, 803. 
31 Specifically, the rule of capture specifies that no single owner of a portion of the 
field may prevent an adjoining landowner from producing oil and gas from the field, even 
if that production pulls minerals from under adjoining lots. See, e.g., Barnard v. Mononga-
hela Natural Gas Co., 65 A. 801, 802–03 (Pa. 1907). For an analysis of the rule of capture 
and its effects, see generally Bruce M. Kramer & Owen L. Anderson, The Rule of Capture–-
An Oil and Gas Perspective, 35 Envtl. L. 899 (2005). 
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that was both physically and economically inefficient.32 In this way, a 
boom-and-bust cycle drove large price swings in the oil industry as new 
fields were discovered. After the discovery of the massive East Texas 
field in 1930, which exacerbated oversupply problems and depressed 
prices, producers appealed for governments to step in.33 
 Consequently, state legislatures in oil-producing states began en-
acting “conservation” statutes authorizing state regulators to organize 
production so as to promote efficiency.34 This kind of state-managed 
production not only helped reduce waste—it also had the happy con-
sequence (for producers) of stabilizing prices, sometimes at levels that 
exceeded competitive rates. Under these conservation schemes, it was 
not uncommon for state governments to restrict production by some 
owners of mineral rights and to regulate the introduction of each own-
er’s product into pipelines. Some of those owners challenged state pro-
duction regulations on constitutional grounds. Courts upheld these 
conservation laws against challenges on substantive due process,35 and 
commerce clause36 grounds, reasoning that their primary purpose was 
to prevent waste and manage resources, a proper exercise of the state’s 
police power. Another set of cases challenged these arrangements on 
antitrust grounds: courts ruled that, even though these regulatory sys-
tems limited competition, the fact that they were managed by a state 
                                                                                                                      
32 Production by multiple owners of a single field constitutes a classic prisoner’s di-
lemma. While the parties might wish to cooperate in order to maximize production from a 
single field, there is an ever-present temptation for each individual owner to defect from 
any cooperative arrangement, thereby garnering more revenue. On the other hand, if all 
parties to the agreement defect, the market for oil is glutted and prices fall. 
33 See Stephen L. McDonald, Petroleum Conservation in the United States: An 
Economic Analysis 36–38 & n.27 (1971). 
34 These statutes are predicated upon the doctrine of “correlative rights” —a recogni-
tion that each owner of the single field has the rights to a fair share of production and 
production revenues. The process of managing the rights of multiple owners of a single 
oilfield involves prorating production and sharing revenues. State commissions like the 
Texas Railroad Commission and the Oklahoma Corporation Commission oversee these 
processes. For a brief history of the early proration orders issued by the Texas and Okla-
homa commissions, see McDonald, supra note 33, at 36–37. For a good discussion of the 
state commissions’ various approaches to this task, see generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., State 
Regulation of Natural Gas in a Federally Deregulated Market: The Tragedy of the Commons Revis-
ited, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 15 (1987). 
35 See, e.g., Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corp. Comm’n of Okla., 286 U.S. 210, 232–34 (1932). 
36 See, e.g., Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179, 186–89 (1950) 
(holding that the statutory grant of power to the Oklahoma Corporation Commission to 
regulate the taking of natural gas from a common source of supply so as to prevent waste 
and protect the public interest does not violate the Commerce Clause of the federal Con-
stitution). 
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agency qualified the regime for immunity from antitrust laws under the 
state action exemption.37 
 Despite state regulation, oil production in the early years of the 
Great Depression still proved difficult to coordinate. Independent pro-
ducers38 evaded the production restrictions imposed by state commis-
sions, and oil prices remained low—artificially low in the view of the 
Roosevelt Administration, which used authority granted under the Na-
tional Industrial Recovery Act39 (NIRA) to impose further restrictions 
on oil production and to police violations of those restrictions.40 This 
planning-based approach to the management of markets41 helped 
bring prices up, until the Supreme Court struck down NIRA on non-
delegation grounds in 1935.42 That same year, Congress approved the 
formation of an interstate compact among oil-producing states, 
through which the members voluntarily coordinated their oil produc-
tion to reduce waste.43 These changes brought some stability to prices 
and helped make production more efficient at and across individual 
fields. Whereas state governments were permitted to stabilize produc-
                                                                                                                      
37 State action immunity was first recognized in the case of Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 
341, 351–52 (1943). For a discussion of the relationship between the state action doctrine 
and state conservation regulation, see generally Chiawen C. Kiew, Contracts, Combinations, 
Conspiracies, and Conservation: Antitrust in Oil Unitization and the Intertemporal Problem, 99 Nw. 
U. L. Rev. 931 (2005). 
38 Independent producers can be distinguished from the larger, so-called “majors.” 
The majors were typically vertically integrated operations, with storage and refining capac-
ity. The independents competed only in the production segment of the industry, and 
needed an immediate outlet for whatever oil they produced. Consequently, independent 
producers were more likely to violate proration agreements, increasing supply and de-
pressing the price. 
39 Ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933), invalidated by A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
40 Those who evaded production restrictions were said to be selling “hot oil” in inter-
state commerce. The administration’s efforts to contain the introduction of hot oil into 
commerce included the creation of an oil code, giving Secretary of the Interior Harold 
Ickes extraordinary federal police powers. Yergin, supra note 16, at 251–54; see also D. 
Bruce Johnsen, Property Rights to Cartel Rents: The Socony-Vacuum Story, 34 J.L. & Econ. 
177, 184 (1991); Daniel A. Crane, The Story of United States v. Socony-Vacuum: Hot Oil and 
Antitrust in the Two New Deals 3–5 ( Jacob Burns Inst. for Advanced Legal Studies, Working 
Paper No. 173, 2006). 
41 NIRA has been cited as an example of the kind of planning-based approach that 
characterized the first New Deal, but it was largely abandoned after 1935. 2 Bruce Acker-
man, We the People: Transformations 310 (1998). 
42 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 541–42; Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 
U.S. 388, 432–33 (1935). 
43 Interstate Oil and Gas Commission Charter, Interstate Oil & Gas Compact Comm’n, 
http://www.iogcc.state.ok.us/charter (last visited Dec. 2, 2011). The compact still exists, and 
counts thirty states among its members. See id. 
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tion levels for producers without risk of antitrust liability, private 
agreements aimed at the same objectives remained legally suspect on 
antitrust grounds. The Supreme Court affirmed as much in 1940 in the 
case of United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,44 in which the Court up-
held a conviction of several oil companies, including progeny of the 
original Standard Oil Company,45 for colluding to fix prices on spot 
markets (essentially by cornering the market) for oil in East Texas and 
the Midwest.46 Thus, as policymakers and courts rejected Rockefeller’s 
vision of planned development led by a dominant firm, reasoning that 
such a firm would try to capture monopoly rents, they established in its 
place a planning system overseen by regulators—one that restricted 
production and propped up prices as a policy objective. 
 In the decades after World War II, market conditions changed in 
ways that reduced the ability of investor-owned oil companies to exert 
market power in the first place, at least with respect to crude oil prices. 
As postwar American oil consumption grew rapidly, crude oil markets 
became geographically broader.47 Despite discoveries of large oilfields 
in Alaska, overseas producers supplied an increasing percentage of 
American oil consumption.48 By 1970, the center of world oil market 
power had shifted to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries (OPEC), itself a cartel that established production quotas so as to 
prop up world oil prices. An OPEC boycott49 of the United States and 
price controls imposed by the Nixon Administration produced a series 
of market distortions during the 1970s, including gasoline shortages 
and price increases that led some industrial consumers to shift away 
                                                                                                                      
44 310 U.S. 150, 210–31 (1940). 
45 “Socony” is derived from the “Standard Oil Company of New York.” Echoing John 
D. Rockefeller, the defendants claimed that their agreement to prop up prices was neces-
sary to avoid some of the destructive “evils” of competition. The court rejected that claim. 
Id. at 211–12. 
46 Ironically, the price-fixing arrangement at issue in Socony-Vacuum was one that had 
been organized originally under federal government oversight pursuant to NIRA. See Crane, 
supra note 40, at 4–12; see also Johnsen, supra note 40, at 185–89 (arguing that majors were 
willing to participate in this arrangement in lieu of expanding their own production in order 
to prop up prices). 
47 See U.S. Oil Demand by End-Use Sector, 1950–2004, U.S. Energy Info. Admin., 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/analysis_publications/oil_market_basics/ 
dem_image_us_cons_sector.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2011); see also Yergin, supra note 16, at 
391. 
48 Yergin, supra note 16, at 391–412. 
49 Id. at 606–32. 
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from oil in favor of coal or electricity as a fuel source.50 The energy cri-
ses of the 1970s coincided with the rise of government-owned national 
oil companies (NOCs) in other oil-producing nations, some of which 
rose from the remnants of nationalized private firms. Thus, while the 
ancestors of Exxon Mobil, Royal Dutch Shell, British Petroleum (BP), 
Chevron and other private companies once controlled the lion’s share 
of world oil production and reserves, it is now the NOCs that collec-
tively dominate the world’s oil reserves.51 
 In any case, the price for crude oil is now set largely by world sup-
ply and demand.52 The world’s crude oil is traded using index crudes 
named after particular oilfields, such as “West Texas Intermediate” 
(WTI) or “Brent Crude.” These index crudes correspond to character-
istics of the product, such as density, sulfur content, etc.53 The decen-
tralization of production and supply, combined with an approximately 
twenty-five percent increase in global consumption of oil since 198054 
means that the volume of oil trade has increased drastically in recent 
decades. By the end of the twentieth century, however, it had become 
clear that American regulators had little power to promote competitive 
crude oil prices through regulation. Antitrust enforcers retained juris-
diction over sales of retail products refined from oil (such as gasoline, 
                                                                                                                      
50 See Int’l Energy Agency, Oil Supply Security: Emergency Response of IEA 
Countries 50 (2007) (showing a sharp trend away from oil-fired generation after the oil 
crises of the 1970s). 
51 A list of the world’s top oil and gas companies by proven reserves is dominated by 
state-owned companies, with Exxon Mobil placing highest among investor-owned majors at 
fourteenth. See World’s Largest Oil and Gas Companies, PetroStrategies, Inc., http://www. 
petrostrategies.org/Links/worlds_largest_oil_and_gas_companies.htm (last updated Oct. 
11, 2011, 8:42 AM). 
52 “Unlike oil’s first century, over the last 20 years no single nation, government, cartel 
or corporation has controlled its fate. Markets have determined prices and investment 
. . . .” Tom Bower, Oil: Money, Politics, and Power in the 21st Century, at xv–xvi 
(2009); see also Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., The Finite World, N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 2010, at A19 
(attributing the volatility of oil prices over the last three years to the forces of world supply 
and demand, particularly demand from China). 
53 For a description of the differences between certain index crudes, see Frequently 
Asked Questions: What Are the Differences Between Various Types of Crude Oil Prices?, U.S. Energy 
Info. Admin., http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=11&t=6 (last updated May 26, 
2011). 
54 According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), world consumption 
increased from just over sixty-three million barrels per day in 1980 to about eighty-five mil-
lion barrels per day in 2008. (A barrel of oil is forty-two gallons.) During that same period, 
consumption in the United States has increased more modestly, from just over 17 million 
barrels per day in 1982 to about 19.5 million barrels per day 2008. World Petroleum Consump-
tion, Annual Estimates, 1980–2008, U.S. Energy Info. Admin. (Oct. 6, 2009), http://www. 
eia.gov/emeu/international/oilconsumption.html (click first “xls” hyperlink to download 
report). 
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propane, heating oil, etc.), and the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC) retained some jurisdiction over the trading of oil 
as a commodity. OPEC and large producing countries may try to influ-
ence world crude oil prices, but investor-owned oil companies cannot. 
B. Gas and Electricity Markets: Public Utilities and the Ex Ante  
Control of Market Power 
 The regulatory response to the problem of market power in natu-
ral gas and electricity markets has differed from that of oil markets. 
Some have advocated government provision of gas and electric services 
as a solution to the market power problem. This impulse was particu-
larly strong in the movement for “public power,”55 which was a staple of 
nineteenth-century populism and early twentieth-century progressiv-
ism. That movement gave birth to federal power agencies56 and the 
many hundreds of municipal utilities57 that dot the American electric 
power landscape. But the model that eventually emerged as dominant 
in American natural gas and electricity markets was that of a private 
(investor owned) “public utility.” As far back as Munn v. Illinois58 in 
1877, the Supreme Court recognized that when an economic activity 
becomes “affected with a public interest,” it may become a proper sub-
ject for regulation, including price regulation.59 Thus, rather than use 
ex post enforcement actions to punish monopoly or anticompetitive 
behavior under antitrust laws, American legislators decided to permit 
regulators to certify monopoly providers of natural gas and electric ser-
vices, and to set the prices of those services ex ante, via regulatory fiat. 
 By the early 1900s, most states had established utilities commis-
sions charged with regulating electric and gas companies, which in-
cluded setting their rates.60 In 1927, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
                                                                                                                      
 
55 In 1940, there were a sufficient number of municipal electric utilities to trigger the 
formation of the American Public Power Association. 
56 These include, for example, the Bonneville Power Administration and the Tennes-
see Valley Authority. For a good description of the public power movement, see Robert A. 
Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The Path to Power 518–28 (1982). 
57 For a list of major municipal utilities, see 251 Publicly Owned Electric & Gas Utilities (US), 
The Utility Connection, http://www.utilityconnection.com/page2e.asp# (last visited Dec. 
2, 2011). 
58 94 U.S. 113, 133–36 (1876). The Court concluded that the operation of grain eleva-
tors in Chicago was an industry that was “affected with a public interest,” upholding price 
regulations on grain storage activities imposed by the State of Illinois. Id. at 129, 133–36. 
59 See id. at 129, 133–36. 
60 The first state public utility commission, the Massachusetts Board of Gas and Elec-
tric Light Commission, was created in the late nineteenth century. See Alfred E. Forstall, 
Governmental Control of the Price of Gas, 3 Pub. Pol’y: A Medium for Diffusing Correct 
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Public Utilities Commission of Rhode Island v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co. 
circumscribed the power of these state commissions to set rates for en-
ergy sold in interstate commerce, paving the way for federal regulation 
of public utilities.61 The Federal Power Act (FPA) of 1935 and the Natu-
ral Gas Act (NGA) of 1938 authorized the Federal Power Commission 
(FPC or “the Commission”)62 to regulate wholesale sales of electricity 
and natural gas, respectively, in interstate commerce, leaving the regu-
lation of retail sales (mostly) to the states.63 In order to address con-
cerns about the accumulation of power by natural gas and electricity 
trusts across multiple states, Congress also passed the Public Utility 
Holding Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA), limiting the horizontal reach 
of utility holding companies.64 
 By this time, public utilities were delivering gas and electricity to 
customers over growing networks of pipelines and wires.65 These com-
panies tended to be vertically integrated,66 and they provided their cus-
tomers with a bundled product: energy (electricity or natural gas) cou-
pled with the service of transmitting it from seller to buyer. The FPC 
                                                                                                                      
Econ. Instruction on Questions of Pub. Pol’y, Nov. 24, 1900, at 329, 332 (describing 
the Massachusetts Commission as the “only organized attempt at government control of 
the gas business in the United States”). The National Association of Regulatory Utility 
Commissioners was established in 1889, offering testimony to the existence of multiple 
state commissions by that point. 
61 273 U.S. 83, 89–90 (1927) (prohibiting state regulation of rates for a wholesale sale 
of electricity across the Massachusetts-Rhode Island border), abrogated by Ark. Elec. Coop. 
Corp. v. Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 375, 393 (1983). 
62 Natural Gas Act, Pub. L. No. 76-88, ch. 556, 52 Stat. 821, 821--22 (1938) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 717 (2006)); Federal Power Act, Pub. L. No. 74-333, ch. 687, pt. 2, 
49 Stat. 803, 847--48 (1935) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824 (2006)). The FPC and 
FERC are one and the same agency: the FPC’s name was changed in 1977 to FERC. De-
partment of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, §§ 401–402, 91 Stat. 565, 582–85 
(1977) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7171–7172 (2006)). 
63 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2006). 
64 Pub. L. No. 74-333, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 803 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 79–79z). The por-
tions of PUHCA relevant to this analysis were repealed by the Energy Policy Act of 2005. 
See Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1263, 119 Stat. 594. 
65 One of the first commercial length natural gas pipelines was built in 1891 and carried 
gas from wells in Indiana to the city of Chicago. Most of the modern pipeline system, how-
ever, was built after World War II. The History of Natural Gas, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, http:// 
fossil.energy.gov/education/energylessons/gas/gas_history.html (last updated Mar. 29, 2011). 
Modern electric transmission systems became possible only after George Westinghouse’s 
development of an alternating current transmission system in the late 1800s. Westinghouse’s 
innovation built upon Nikola Tesla’s work with transformers (which enabled companies to 
increase and decrease voltage along the transmission system). Klein, supra note 8, at 329–30. 
66 This kind of integration was less complete on the gas side. Indeed, the NGA was a 
response to complaints by natural gas producers about alleged abuses committed by own-
ers of pipelines. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Evolution of Natural Gas Regulatory Policy, Nat. 
Resources & Env’t, Summer 1995, at 53, 53–54. 
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and its state analogues approved the utility’s revenue requirements (for 
wholesale and retail sales, respectively), permitting electric and gas 
utilities to recover their reasonably incurred costs and a fair return (but 
no more) on their capital investments.67 The utility filed a tariff with 
the commission, specifying how it would recover its revenues through 
the rates it charged each class of customers—residential, commercial, 
or industrial. Both the FPA and the NGA specified that the FPC must 
set rates at a “just and reasonable” level: rates that would permit utilities 
to attract sufficient capital to provide reliable service to customers, but 
without capturing monopoly rents.68 From this common starting point, 
the regulation of natural gas and electric markets took parallel— some-
times intersecting, but generally distinct—paths forward. 
1. Natural Gas Markets 
 Although substantial vertical integration in both the natural gas 
and electricity industries existed prior to World War II, most wellhead 
production of natural gas was not controlled by gas utilities; to the con-
trary, there were thousands of wellhead producers of gas in the United 
States. Like oil production, gas production follows the rule of capture 
and became subject to the same kind of state conservation regulation 
as oil production.69 In the years immediately following passage of the 
NGA, the FPC permitted sales by wellhead producers (whose point of 
sale was at the introduction of their gas to the pipeline system owned by 
gas utilities) at market rates, regulating prices charged only for those 
wholesale transactions involving parties downstream of the wellhead. In 
1955, however, the Supreme Court held in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wis-
consin that wellhead sales were subject to rate regulation under the 
NGA,70 a decision that led eventually to the establishment of rates that 
discouraged exploration and production. The resulting natural gas 
                                                                                                                      
67 The standard way of describing the rate making process is to say that, in rate cases, 
utility commissions typically make rate decisions using the following equation: R = Br + O, 
where R represents the company’s total revenue requirements, B represents the rate base, r 
represents the permissible rate of return on investment, and O represents permissible 
operating expenses. Assets that are used and are useful to the company’s task of supplying 
electric service are includable within the rate base, and are those on which the company is 
guaranteed a fair return. 
68 In practice, courts have shown great deference to FERC’s rate making decisions. See 
Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 617–18 (1944). 
69 See supra notes 34–46 and accompanying text. 
70 347 U.S. 672, 685 (1954). 
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shortage71 prompted Congress to pass the Natural Gas Policy Act of 
1978 (“NGPA”),72 a labyrinthian statute that eventually deregulated 
wellhead gas sales, and brought rational pricing to the market for well-
head sales (sometimes called “first sales”) of gas.73 
 Experience with phased deregulation of wellhead sales under the 
NGPA, combined with a sea change in economic thinking about the 
wisdom of public utility rate regulation74 led policymakers to begin to 
reconsider the traditional regulatory model for natural gas. The NGPA 
did not deregulate prices of wholesale transactions downstream of 
wellhead sales; the FPC continued to regulate the rates charged for 
those sales, and those sales remained bundled. In the 1970s and 1980s, 
economists began to rethink the wisdom of this approach, and to chal-
lenge the ideas that the provision of energy service is a natural monop-
oly and that the production and delivery of energy are necessarily one 
bundled product.75 
                                                                                                                      
 
71 In the early 1970s, U.S. proven reserves of natural gas had fallen to a little over two-
hundred trillion cubic feet. At that time, American consumption was in the neighborhood 
of twenty trillion cubic feet a year, leading some analysts to state that the United States had 
only ten years worth of natural gas supply and reserve. See Fed. Power Comm’n, Annual 
Report 30–36 (1971). 
72 Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3352 (15 U.S.C. §§ 3301–3432 (2006)). 
73 For a description of the early effects of the NGPA, see generally Richard J. Pierce, 
Reconsidering the Roles of Regulation and Competition in the Natural Gas Industry, 97 Harv. L. 
Rev. 345 (1983). For a description of the strange and unpredictable trajectory of natural 
gas prices during the slow deregulation process under the NGPA, see James M. Griffin & 
Henry B. Steele, Energy Economics and Policy 301–03 (1986). 
74 The impulse to restructure both the electric and the gas industries was part of a 
trend in economic thinking in the 1970s and 1980s that observed increased faith in the 
ability of markets to achieve efficient outcomes through competition and reduced faith in 
the ability of governments to achieve efficient outcomes through regulation. See Sidney A. 
Shapiro & Joseph P. Tomain, Regulatory Law and Policy: Cases and Materials 20–
21 (3d ed. 2003) (describing a move away from regulation in general and noting the effect 
on natural gas and electricity industries); David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive 
Energy Markets?, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 765, 770–74 (2008) (describing the “unbundling” of 
energy production and distribution as a result of changing economic and political views of 
regulation in the United States and Europe during the 1980s); see also Harold Demsetz, 
Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & Econ. 55, 65 (1968); Oliver E. Williamson, Franchise Bidding 
for Natural Monopolies—In General and with Respect to CATV, 7 Bell J. Econ. 73, 73–76 
(1976). 
75 Furthermore, rate regulation of investor-owned utilities entails considerable transac-
tion costs. See Antonio Estache & David Martimort, Politics, Transaction Costs, and the Design of 
Regulatory Institutions 1–2 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 2073, 1999), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=620512 (describing transac-
tion costs in regulation as an asymmetric information problem). 
Regulators must depend on the regulated firms to divulge their cost information. 
While public utility commission staff and ratepayer advocate groups intervene in rate cases 
and review this information, they cannot hope to overcome the information asymmetries 
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 In 1992, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) or-
dered full unbundling of gas transmission services from gas sales by all 
pipelines in its Order 636;76 by this time, it had already begun to au-
thorize wholesale sales of gas at market based rates.77 Cognizant of the 
potential for sellers of gas to abuse market power, FERC granted this 
authority only to sellers that were unaffiliated with pipelines.78 After 
Order 636, pipeline customers—mostly local distribution utilities, elec-
tric generators, and large industrial users participating in wholesale 
markets—were free to buy their gas at the best available price, hiring 
the pipeline only to transport the gas at posted, regulated rates. As the 
twentieth century drew to a close, gas transmission remained subject to 
rate regulation under the NGA, but most wholesale sales of the natural 
gas itself were made at market rates.79 
 Then, as now, the physical trading of natural gas consumed in the 
United States happens mostly at twenty-four American trading hubs, 
such as the Henry Hub in Louisiana, and a few additional hubs in Can-
ada.80 Natural gas produced at the wellhead varies in quality (mainly by 
the type and amount of impurities mixed with the methane), but it is 
traded as a fungible commodity. Its price varies not with quality, but with 
location; regional price differences reflect the cost of transporting gas 
from producers to consumers. Unlike oil markets, natural gas markets 
are regional. The United States produces most of its own natural gas, 
but also imports some gas as well (mostly by pipeline from Canada and 
                                                                                                                      
inherent in the process. See id. To its critics, a system with high transaction costs, informa-
tion asymmetries, and perverse incentives will yield unnecessarily high electric rates in 
both wholesale and retail markets. For a good discussion of these efficiency issues, see 
Stephen Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Re-
form, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 547, 551, 609 (1979) (providing a basic framework for analyzing 
regulation and concluding that the energy market is a good candidate for “less restrictive 
alternatives” to regulation). 
76 Pipeline Service Obligations and Revisions to Regulations Governing Self-Implement-
ing Transportation and Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decon-
trol, Order No. 636, 57 Fed. Reg. 13,267, 13,270 (FERC Apr. 16, 1992) (to be codified at 18 
C.F.R. pt. 284); Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol; Order 
Denying Rehearing and Clarifying, Order Nos. 636 and 636-A, 57 Fed. Reg. 57,911, 57,914 
(FERC Nov. 27, 1992). 
77 Regulations Governing Blanket Marketer Sales Certificates, 57 Fed. Reg. 57,952, 
57,953 n.4 (FERC Dec. 8, 1992) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 284). 
78 FERC Blanket Marketing Certificates, 18 C.F.R. § 284.402 (2011). 
79 See id. 
80 For a full description of natural gas trade flows and market centers in the United 
States, see U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Office of Oil & Gas, Natural Gas Market Cen-
ters: A 2008 Update 1, 7 fig.3 (2009), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/ 
natural_gas/feature_articles/2009/ngmarketcenter/ngmarketcenter.pdf. 
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by tanker in the form of liquefied natural gas, or LNG).81 The develop-
ment of more efficient, less expensive methods to extract plentiful natu-
ral gas trapped very deep under the ground in shale deposits across the 
country promises to make the United States even more self-sufficient.82 
2. Electricity Markets 
 While the evolution of electricity markets is similar in many re-
spects to that of natural gas markets, there are at least two important 
differences. First, twentieth-century electric utilities were more verti-
cally integrated than their natural gas counterparts, in that traditional 
electric utilities owned most of their own generation. Thus, merchant 
generators were virtually unheard of prior to 1980, and arms-length 
transactions on wholesale markets were relatively few. Second, unlike 
oil or natural gas, electricity is not storable.83 That is, the amount of 
electricity being produced and added to the electric grid by generators 
must be roughly equivalent to the amount removed from the grid by 
consumers at any given point in time. Thus, while both gas and electric 
networks must maintain a certain level of balance, the problem is far 
more acute on the electric grid than it is in the natural gas pipeline 
network. Failure to keep the system in balance can result in system fail-
ure, like the massive blackouts that hit the northeastern United States 
in 1965 and the upper Midwest in 2003.84 
 These differences have complicated the journey from regulation to 
markets within the electric industry, though that journey has followed 
the same conceptual path as natural gas restructuring. Vertically inte-
grated electric utilities charging administratively set rates dominated the 
                                                                                                                      
81 The United States consumed about 646 billion cubic meters of natural gas in 2009, 
and produced more than two-thirds of that amount domestically. BP Statistical Review 
of World Energy June 2011, at 22–25 (2011), http://www.bp.com/sectionbodycopy. 
do?categoryId=7500&contentId=7068481 (click hyperlink to “Statistical Review of World 
Energy 2011”). The United States now produces more than five-sixths of its natural gas 
needs. See id. 
82 The technical advances that have made this possible are associated with horizontal 
drilling and the process of hydraulic fracturing, which permits gas companies to produce 
more gas from shale deposits. For a good description of this industry and its regulation, 
see generally Hannah Wiseman, Untested Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing in Oil and 
Gas Production and the Need to Revisit Regulation, 20 Fordham Envtl. L. Rev. 115 (2009). 
83 Gas networks have some associated storage capacity, but it is measured typically in days, 
rather than months. See William F. Bailey et al., State Regulation of Oil and Gas Production, in 1 
Energy Law and Transactions: 2011 Cumulative Supplement, ch. 5, § 5.01[2] (David J. 
Muchow & William A. Mogel eds., 2011). 
84 See infra notes 124–148 and accompanying text. 
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electricity industry well into the 1990s.85 The seeds of change were sown 
with the passage of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 197886 
(PURPA), which promoted conservation and “alternative” forms of elec-
tricity production by providing financial incentives to new, nonutility 
producers87 of renewable electricity and cogeneration.88 The presence 
of nonutility generators in the market created pressure for nondiscrimi-
natory access to the electric grid, so that these nonutility generators 
could sell their electricity directly to retailers or industrial customers. 
Congress responded to that pressure in the Energy Policy Act of 199289 
(“EPAct 1992”) by authorizing FERC to order electric utilities to “wheel” 
power (that is, to transmit power for third parties) over their transmis-
sion lines.90 FERC exercised that power in 1996 when it promulgated 
Orders 888 and 889, mandating (1) that electricity transmission from 
electricity sales in wholesale markets be unbundled and (2) that owners 
of transmission lines act as common carriers providing transmission ser-
vice on a nondiscriminatory basis to affiliated and non-affiliated com-
panies alike.91 As a consequence of this unbundling, FERC began to 
authorize wholesale sellers of electricity to charge market-based rates on 
                                                                                                                      
85 U.S. Energy Info. Admin., The Changing Structure of the Electric Power 
Industry 2000: An Update, at i, 5–8 (2000), http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/electricity/chg_ 
stru_update/update2000.pdf [hereinafter Changing Structure]. 
86 Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117. 
87 In PURPA parlance, these nonutility generators were called “qualifying facilities” (or 
“QFs”) because they qualified for the financial benefits offered under the statute. 
88 PURPA defined “alternative” energy facilities to include various forms of renewable 
energy like solar, wind, and geothermal, as well as small hydroelectric facilities and co-
generation plants. Cogeneration facilities produce electricity as well as usable heat energy, 
and most of the many hundreds of cogeneration facilities built after the passage of PURPA 
in the 1980s were gas-fired. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (2006). 
89 See Pub. L. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992). 
90 Id. §§ 711 (repealed), 712, 721, 106 Stat. at 2905–11, 2915 (current version at 16 
U.S.C. §§ 824j, 2621 (Supp. III 2011) (requiring open access to transmission lines). 
91 Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory 
Transmission Services by Public Utilities, Order 888, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,541–43 (FERC 
May 10, 1996) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 37); Open Access Same-Time Information Sys-
tem (Formerly Real-Time Information Networks) and Standards of Conduct, Order 889, 61 
Fed. Reg. 21,737, 21,740–41 (FERC Apr. 24, 1996) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 37). Order 
888 required transmission line owners to file so-called “open-access tariffs” offering nondis-
criminatory transmission services and to “functionally unbundle” transmission from electric-
ity sales. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory 
Transmission Services By Public Utilities, Order 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,541–43. Order 889 
mandated transparency in transmission services by requiring all takers of transmission ser-
vices (including affiliates of the transmission owner) to take such services using an open-
access posting system. Open Access Same-Time Information System (Formerly Real-Time 
Information Networks) and Standards of Conduct, Order 889, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,740–41. 
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a broad scale, conditioning those grants of authority on the sellers’ lack 
of market power.92 Transmission rates remained regulated. 
                                                                                                                     
 At around the same time, a sizeable minority of American states 
began to introduce competition and market-based rates into their retail 
markets, with California, Texas, and New York leading the way.93 As a 
consequence of these developments, many incumbent utilities in these 
states sold most of their generation assets or spun them off into sub-
sidiaries, increasing the profile of independent merchant generators, 
marketers, and brokers within the industry. Consequently, the number 
and volume of arms-length transactions on wholesale electricity mar-
kets grew by leaps and bounds, straining the capacity of both the 
transmission grid and regulators. In response, FERC pushed owners of 
transmission lines to form “independent system operators” (ISOs) and 
“regional transmission organizations” (RTOs) to help manage the grid, 
ensure system reliability, and guard against discrimination and the ex-
ercise of market power in the provision of transmission services.94 By 
the turn of the century, active electricity trading hubs had arisen 
around several of these ISOs and RTOs, including the Pennsylvania-
New Jersey-Maryland (PJM) ISO, the New York ISO, the California ISO, 
and the New England ISO.95 In states that opted out of retail restruc-
turing, some public utilities continued to generate most of the electric-
ity they sold to customers, while others satisfied most of their electricity 
needs from wholesale markets. In any case, because electricity demand 
is highly variable (both daily and seasonally), most electricity retailers 
must participate in these spot markets in order to balance supply with 
demand. 
II. Twenty-First Century Energy Markets: Toward a Securities 
Regulation Model 
 By the turn of the twenty-first century, oil, gas, and electricity mar-
kets had become ever more decentralized and competitive. The owners 
of transmission networks—oil and gas pipelines, and the electric grid— 
remained subject to rate regulation, but within the energy industry, 
disaggregated markets and intense competition now prevailed where 
vertical integration had once been the norm. Wholesale sales of elec-
 
92 See, e.g., Entergy Services, Inc., 58 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,234 (1992) (authorizing electricity 
sales at market-based rates). 
93 See Changing Structure, supra note 85, at 74–77. 
94 Regional Transmission Organizations, Order No. 2000, 89 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,285 (1999). 
95 For a description of the status of electricity trading hubs at the turn of the century, 
see Changing Structure, supra note 85, at 74–78. 
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tricity and gas that had once been informal, inter-firm transactions96 
were now arms-length transactions between unaffiliated companies. 
Table 1 summarizes some of the important characteristics of American 
energy markets in the twenty-first century. 
Table 1: Characteristics of Energy Product Markets 






World market price, with 
regional and quality 
adjustments; 





for refined products. 
Crude oil varies by 
quality and energy 
content; 





Bilateral and spot 
(including system 
balancing) markets; 
Competition and market 
prices in all phases except 










Local and Regional 
(subnational) prices; 
Bilateral and spot 
(including system 
balancing) markets; 
Competition and market 
prices, except for internal 
production by vertically 
integrated firms; 
Transmission prices are 
regulated. 
Regulated monopolies 
in three-fourths of 
states; remainder have 
competitive markets. 
Fungible commodity; 




 Today, the energy commodities trade is booming, but it is also 
much more complex and less regulated than ever before, provoking 
concerns that consumers may be exploited in these turbulent, modern 
energy markets.97 More specifically, regulators worry about detecting 
                                                                                                                      
96 For public utilities, these transactions were relatively informal: when power was 
needed, neighboring utilities would step in and provide it with the understanding that the 
buyer would reciprocate in the seller’s time of need, and each party could recover their 
costs through regulated rates. 
97 See, e.g., Gerald Norlander, May the FERC Rely on Markets to Set Electric Rates?, 24 En-
ergy L.J. 65, 88 (2003); Rachel Warnick Petty, A Light in the Darkness: The Case for Judicial 
Antitrust Enforcement in the Electric Wholesale Industry, 5 Tex. J. Oil, Gas, & Energy L. 55, 
55–57 (2009); Jacqueline Lang Weaver, Can Energy Markets Be Trusted? The Effect of the Rise 
and Fall of Enron on Energy Markets, 4 Hous. Bus. & Tax L.J. 1, 6–25 (2004). 
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the exercise of market power by sellers in wholesale markets, and the 
rapidly growing markets for complex energy derivatives98 provide addi-
tional opportunities for companies to enrich themselves at the expense 
of consumers. These worries have been exacerbated by the significant 
price volatility and price increases witnessed in the energy markets over 
the last decade. Investigations following the California electricity crisis 
in 2000–2001 revealed a variety of ways in which wholesale sellers ex-
erted market power or manipulated electricity and gas markets to the 
detriment of buyers.99 Regulators found that some of these manipulat-
ive techniques exploited relationships between physical markets for 
energy and derivatives markets. Later in the decade, as oil and gas pric-
es spiked to unprecedented levels, regulators and policymakers ex-
pressed concerns that speculators in physical and derivatives markets 
were driving prices beyond levels attributable to the forces of supply 
and demand for physical energy. 
A. The Rise of Energy Derivatives 
 Energy derivatives markets emerged as a response to increased 
price risk: that is, formerly dominant market participants like the oil 
majors and traditional public utilities turned to energy derivatives 
(such as energy futures contracts) to hedge their new exposure to price 
risk in energy commodities markets. Commodities traders have used 
derivatives to hedge price risk for centuries, and the Commodities Ex-
change Act (CEA)100 has regulated (mostly agricultural) commodities 
futures since the time of the New Deal.101 Traders in energy derivatives 
markets may be energy companies interested in the physical delivery of 
oil, gas, or electricity, or they may be banks and other financial specula-
tors interested purely in the possibility of making money by speculating 
in the market. In essence, derivatives are bets based on projections of 
the future price of the commodity: typically, at settlement, the party 
who bet wrong pays the party who bet right. Some derivatives, like “fu-
tures”102 or “option”103 contracts, are standardized contracts traded on 
                                                                                                                      
 
98 For a fuller explanation of energy derivatives, see infra notes 100–123 and accompa-
nying text. 
99 See infra notes 149–180 and accompanying text. 
100 7 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
101 For an interesting history of commodities regulation in the United States, see Wen-
dy L. Gramm & Gerald D. Gay, Scams, Scoundrels, and Scapegoats: A Taxonomy of CEA Regula-
tion over Derivative Instruments, J. Derivatives, Spring 1994, at 6, 8–16. 
102 An energy futures contract is a contract in which one party agrees to provide the 
other party with energy on a future date at a specified price. Futures contracts are traded 
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exchanges like the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX); these 
have traditionally been regulated by the CFTC.104 Other so-called “over-
the-counter” (OTC) energy derivatives, like “forward contracts”105 or 
“swaps,”106 may or may not be standardized, and have traditionally been 
less closely regulated. 
 Commodities exchanges like NYMEX or the Chicago Board of 
Trade (CBOT) are structured similarly to securities exchanges like the 
New York Stock Exchange. They are membership organizations that 
engage in considerable self-regulation under the oversight of a federal 
regulator—in this case the CFTC. Exchange trading of commodities 
entails relatively little risk of counterparty default, since members must 
meet specified capital requirements and exchange-traded derivatives 
(including energy futures) are settled daily; that is, as the market price 
of the commodity moves relative to the futures contract price, the par-
ties’ accounts are debited or credited to account for the difference. 
Most futures contracts do not contemplate delivery of the commodity 
at expiration; instead, the parties settle only their financial differences. 
If one party was hedging and needs to buy or sell the underlying physi-
                                                                                                                      
on commodities exchanges and the exchange assumes some of the credit risk (risk of de-
fault by either party). Such contracts are cleared daily and usually settled financially—that 
is, no physical delivery of energy takes place. For a good description of energy futures con-
tracts, see N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc., A Guide to Energy Hedging 6 (1999). 
103 An option contract is a contract in which one party purchases the right to make a 
future purchase or sale at an agreed-upon price. Black’s Law Dictionary 1203 (9th ed. 
2009). The purchaser of the option pays for it regardless of whether the option is ever 
exercised. Id. For an account of the use of options in energy markets, see Steven Ferrey, 
Inverting Choice of Law in the Wired Universe: Thermodynamics, Mass, and Energy, 45 Wm. & 
Mary L. Rev. 1839, 1937–38 (2004). 
104 Changes to the Commodities Exchange Act in 1974 established the basics of the 
current regulatory regime administered by the CFTC. Commodity Futures Trading Com-
mission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. 
§§ 1–27 (2006)). 
105 Forward contracts are like futures contracts in that they too represent an agree-
ment to deliver and take energy in the future at an agreed-upon price. Forward contracts, 
however, are not traded on commodities exchanges and leave the parties with more credit 
risk. For a good description of forward contracts, see Thomas G. Kelch & Howard J. Weg, 
Forward Contracts, Bankruptcy Safe Harbors and the Electricity Industry, 51 Wayne L. Rev. 49, 
63–80 (2005). 
106 Swaps represent a bet on future market prices whereby the contracting parties 
agree to exchange their interest-payment obligations. Black’s Law Dictionary, supra 
note 103, at 1585. For an explanation of the use of swaps, see Carolyn H. Jackson, Note, 
Have You Hedged Today? The Inevitable Advent of Consumer Derivatives, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 
3205, 3208–14 (1999). 
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cal commodity, it does so in the spot or “cash” markets.107 OTC deriva-
tive markets, by contrast, arose outside of CFTC jurisdiction, and typi-
cally involve greater counterparty risk. 
 The first energy derivatives arose during the 1980s in oil mar-
kets.108 The NYMEX began trading oil futures in the early 1980s,109 and 
oil derivatives markets grew exponentially throughout the 1990s and 
into the twenty-first century. For example, the total volume of NYMEX 
futures contracts in light sweet crude oil (West Texas Intermediate 
(WTI) crude, traded in one-thousand barrel increments) increased 
from fewer than 100,000 contracts in 1985 to more than 1.5 million 
contracts in 2007.110 The NYMEX began trading natural gas futures 
contracts (in 10,000 MMBtu111 increments) in 1990, and electricity fu-
tures (traded in a variety of increments) in 1996; in both of these mar-
kets, volumes also grew quickly and steadily.112 
 While the CEA prohibits both manipulation and “corner[ing]” of 
commodities markets,113 the 1974 amendments to the CEA broadened 
the CFTC’s jurisdiction over commodities futures, by expanding the 
definition of the term “commodity,” requiring that all futures trading 
be done on regulated exchanges. The statute neglected to define “fu-
tures contracts,” however, putting some OTC trading into legal doubt, 
particularly trading in forward contracts, which are less standardized 
                                                                                                                      
107 For a good explanation of exchange trading of energy derivatives, see Alexia Bru-
net & Meredith Shafe, Beyond Enron: Regulation in Energy Derivatives Trading, 27 Nw. J. Int’l 
L. & Bus. 665, 670–71 (2007). 
108 A senior trader for Royal Dutch Shell, created a forward contract called “15 day 
Brent,” based upon crude found in the Brent field in the North Sea. The contract re-
quired physical delivery at a specified price and location. For a description of the origins 
of this derivative and subsequent attempts by traders to corner the market, see Bower, 
supra note 52, at 44–57. 
109 For a brief history of the NYMEX and early oil futures trading on the exchange, see 
Yergin, supra note 16, at 724–26. Trade in home heating oil and some other retail energy 
products preceded trade in crude oil by several years. Id. 
110 See EIA, Short-Term Energy Outlook Supplement: Energy Price Volatility 
and Forecast Uncertainty 5 fig. 3 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 Energy Outlook Supp.], 
available at http://205.254.135.7/forecasts/steo/special/pdf/2009_sp_05.pdf. 
111 A British Thermal Unit, or Btu, is the amount of heat required to increase the tem-
perature of a pound of water (which weighs exactly sixteen ounces) by one degree Fahr-
enheit. The term “MMBtu” means one million (one thousand thousands) Btus. 
112 For example, the total volume of open Henry Hub natural gas futures contracts at 
the start of 1991 was only a few thousand; it had increased to more than 150,000 by 2009. 
See 2009 Energy Outlook Supp., supra note 110, at 6 fig. 4. 
113 See 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2) (2006) (held unconstitutional as applied in United States v. 
Radley, 659 F. Supp. 2d 803, 820 (S.D. Tex. 2009)). 
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OTC substitutes for futures.114 In the late 1980s, this uncertainty was 
exacerbated by a case decided in 1990 by the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York, Transnor (Bermuda) Ltd. v. BP North Amer-
ica Petroleum.115 Although commentators continue to dispute the rela-
tive culpability of the parties in this case,116 the key question was wheth-
er the fifteen-day Brent contracts were “futures” subject to CFTC 
regulation or “forwards” exempt from regulation. The court concluded 
that because fifteen-day Brent contracts were relatively standardized 
instruments, most of which were executed without any physical delivery 
of the underlying commodity, they were futures contracts subject to 
CEA jurisdiction.117 
 In 1992, Congress amended the CEA to authorize the CFTC to 
exempt certain commodities derivatives from CEA regulation,118 au-
thority that the CFTC exercised in 1993 by exempting energy forward 
contracts from its regulations.119 Congress took more definitive action 
                                                                                                                      
 
114 Id. § 1a(6)(A). The CEA does not define a futures contract, but it does refer to con-
tracts “of sale of a commodity for future delivery.” Id. Courts have tended to distinguish 
between futures and forwards based upon the parties’ purposes. Forward contracts involve 
transactions in which the parties intend (and can accommodate) physical transfer of the 
actual commodity. Futures contracts are contracts whose primary purpose is to assume or 
shift price risk without transferring the underlying commodity. See CFTC v. Co Petro Mktg. 
Grp., Inc., 680 F.2d 573, 578–79 (9th Cir. 1982); NRT Metals, Inc. v. Manhattan Metals 
(Non-Ferrous), Ltd., 576 F. Supp. 1046, 1050–51 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
115 738 F. Supp. 1472, 1489–93 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
116 According to a report, investor-owned oil companies resorted to “skulduggery” by 
“churning trades of [Brent crude]” so as to depress the price. Bower, supra note 52, at 53. 
These phony trades were conducted in order to “reap lucrative tax advantages from the 15-
day market.” Id. Transnor, according to the report, was the victim of a squeeze—a kind of 
manipulation of market prices based upon purchase of a dominant share of the available 
supply. Id. at 55–57. By contrast, another report states that Transnor was merely “at-
tempt[ing] to recover losses resulting from trades” after an unexpected decline in prices. 
Gramm & Gay, supra note 101, at 15; see also Louis Phlips, Oligopolistic Pricing of Crude Oil 
Futures, 68 Econ. Record 75, 102 (1992) (using game theoretic methods to analyze the 
fifteen-day Brent crude market during the late 1980s and concluding that oligopolistic 
conditions in that market enabled “producers of Brent crude to influence the [price] in 
their favour near maturity”). 
117 Transnor, 738 F. Supp. at 1489–93. The court acknowledged that fifteen-day Brent 
contracts “may represent binding commitments to buy or sell physical oil,” but “the real 
question . . . is whether the transactions are more like bargains for the purchase and sale 
of crude oil than speculative transactions tacitly expected to end by means other than de-
livery.” Id. at 1491–92. The court concluded that since the “opportunity” to settle without 
delivery is a “common practice” in the market, fifteen-day Brent crude contracts were in-
deed futures. Id. 
118 Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-546, 106 Stat. 3590 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.). 
119 In April 1993, the CFTC promulgated a final order generally exempting from the 
CEA qualifying energy contracts commercial participants and certain other specified enti-
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seven years later when it passed the Commodities Futures Moderniza-
tion Act (CFMA), exempting from most CFTC regulation OTC trading 
of energy derivatives by sophisticated or institutional parties.120 This 
provision became known as “the Enron loophole.”121 Passage of the 
CFMA sparked a rapid expansion in OTC trading, including trading of 
both the standardized and non-standardized derivatives on electronic 
exchanges, particularly London’s Intercontinental Exchange (ICE). 
For example, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) re-
ported a more than fourfold increase in trading of energy derivatives 
on the ICE between 2003 and 2006.122 
 This explosive growth in the use of energy derivatives coincided 
with a period of price volatility on energy markets.123 Energy markets 
experienced a succession of price shocks during the first decade of the 
twenty-first century, beginning with the California electricity crisis in 
the winter of 2000–2001, which led to a succession of prosecutions of 
electricity and gas traders in the early 2000s. In the ensuing years, oil 
and gas markets experienced unprecedented price spikes and volatility. 
Analysts disagree about the role played by derivatives trading and spec-
ulation in this price behavior. Yet, in each case, regulators responded by 
imposing new rules on physical and financial energy markets—rules 
borrowed from securities laws. 
B. The California Electricity Crisis and Its Aftermath 
1. What Went Wrong 
 When California moved to competitive markets after 1996, its 
wholesale power market was structured so as to discourage the use of 
derivatives and long-term bilateral contracts by the incumbent electri-
cal utilities that were the major purchasers in the California wholesale 
                                                                                                                      
ties entered. Exemption for Certain Contracts Involving Energy Products, 58 Fed. Reg. 
21,286, 21,293–94 (Apr. 20, 1993). 
120 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(1) (2006). 
121 By the end of the twentieth century, Enron had become the largest and most inno-
vative trader of energy commodities in the United States; acting as both a broker and par-
ticipant in energy commodities markets, Enron had sought the CFMA’s broad exemption 
for OTC trading of energy derivatives. For a summary of the rise of Enron’s participation 
in energy commodities trading in the latter part of the twentieth century, see generally 
Weaver, supra note 97. 
122 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-08-25, Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission: Trends in Energy Derivatives Markets Raise Questions About CFTC’S 
Oversight 18 fig.3 (2007) [hereinafter Trends in Energy Derivatives]. 
123 See id. at 18–19. 
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market.124 California required most electricity sales to be conducted 
through a spot market, which seemed to work fairly well until the win-
ter of 2000–2001, at which point it experienced an unusually severe and 
sustained price spike in which daily average prices rose to many times 
historic levels.125 That is, wholesale buyers who were used to paying less 
than $50 per megawatt hour for electricity were paying monthly average 
wholesale prices that exceeded $250 per megawatt hour for certain 
months during that winter of 2000–2001.126 
 A variety of forces contributed to the crisis, including insufficient 





a rapid rise in generator costs,129 transmission bottlenecks,130 
retail-price caps in some parts of California (which kept demand high 
                                                                                                                      
124 In the initial phases of the restructured California market, the California Public 
Utilities Commission (PUC) did not permit use of long-term or futures contracts. Further, 
having had no previous experience with price risk, the California utilities did not make 
much use of these tools when the PUC relaxed its restrictions against their use immedi-
ately prior to the crisis. U.S. Cong. Budget Office, Causes and Lessons of the Cali-
fornia Electricity Crisis 21–22 (2001), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/30xx/ 
doc3062/CaliforniaEnergy.pdf. 
125 See Michael W. Lynch & Adrian Moore, Power Tripped: Faulty Re-regulation Turns Out 
the Lights in the Golden State, Reason, June 2001, at 33, 38–39. 
126 See id. 
127 As has been widely reported, electric capacity in California declined during the 
1990s, while demand grew by more than ten percent. See Subsequent Events–-California’s 
Energy Crisis, U.S. Energy Info. Admin. Electricity, http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/ 
electricity/california/subsequentevents.html (last modified June 8, 2005, 2:30 PM). 
128 These included a drought in the Pacific Northwest, which reduced the amount of 
hydroelectric power available in the California market. California traditionally relies on 
hydroelectric generation for about twenty-five percent of its power. See, e.g., Ahmad Faru-
qui et al., Getting Out of the Dark: Market-Based Pricing Could Prevent Future Crises, 24 Regula-
tion, Fall 2001, at 58, 59, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv24n3/ 
specialreport2.pdf#page=2. In addition, the supply of natural gas to feed gas-fired genera-
tors in southern California was interrupted by an explosion at an El Paso pipeline in the 
winter of 2000–2001. See Energy Crisis Overview: How We Got Here, SFGate.com (May 8, 
2001), http://articles.sfgate.com/2001-05-08/bay-area/17596648_1_electricity-rate-freeze-
power-exchange. 
129 Natural gas prices in California were high as the crisis began and steadily increased 
to unprecedented levels as generators ran nonstop to take advantage of high wholesale 
electricity prices. See, e.g., What Can Be Learned from California’s Electricity Crisis?, Research 
Brief Pub. Pol’y Inst. of Cal., Jan. 2003, at 1–2, available at http://www.ppic.org/con- 
tent/pubs/rb/RB_103CWRB.pdf. 
130 Path 15 is the major north-south transmission line in California. See, e.g., News Re-
lease, California ISO, ISO Board of Governor’s [sic] Approves Path 15 Upgrade: Board Finds 
Project Cost Effective and Good for the Grid ( June 25, 2002), available at www.caiso.com/ 
Documents/ISOBoardGovernor’sApprovesPath15UpgradeBoardFindsProjectCostEffectiveand 
Good_theGrid.pdf. At the time of the crisis, its capacity narrowed to two 500 kilovolt (kV) 
lines in central California, which was insufficient to handle the necessary load. The line is 
being expanded to three 500 kV lines. Id. 
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despite very high wholesale prices), and manipulation of the market by 
sellers. In hindsight, the California market design seemed to invite ma-
nipulation by channeling most sales through the California Power Ex-
change (CalPX) spot market, and providing that all sales would be 
made at the market clearing price. Supply margins were low to nonexis-
tent during periods of peak use, so individual sellers could charge very 
high rates during these peak periods, resulting in a windfall for all sell-
ers during those periods. Wholesale buyers (mainly the incumbent 
large utilities) were obliged to provide electric service to their custom-
ers, most of whom were paying rates for power that were capped (by 
statute) at levels often below the wholesale price. Thus, price spikes did 
not trigger any decrease in consumer demand, providing even more 
incentive to wholesale sellers to charge ever higher prices. Post-crisis 
investigations of California’s dysfunctional electricity markets revealed 
that many sellers took advantage of these unique opportunities to cap-
ture scarcity rents.131 
 It also emerged that large numbers of market participants engaged 
in a variety of forms of fraud and manipulation on California spot mar-
kets.132 Some sellers withheld generation to increase scarcity and drive 
up price.133 Others merely capitalized on scarcity, recognizing that they 
could charge exorbitant rates knowing that wholesale purchasers and 
retailers had no choice but to buy the power in order to serve their cus-
tomers.134 Some scheduled fraudulent transactions that created conges-
tion on the electric grid, so as to be able to claim compensation (under 
California grid congestion relief rules) when the transactions were sub-
sequently canceled.135 Some scheduled multiple, high-volume “wash 
                                                                                                                      
 
131 For a good summary of the various techniques used to “game” the California mar-
kets during the crisis, see FERC, Docket No. PA02-2-00, Final Report on Price Manipu-
lation in Western Markets: Fact-Finding Investigation of Potential Manipula-
tion of Electric and Natural Gas Prices, at ES-1 to -3 (2003) [hereinafter Final 
Report on Manipulation]. The term “scarcity rents” (or, sometimes, “economic rent”), 
refers to profits over and above those sellers could earn in a competitive market due to the 
relative scarcity of the product sold. See, e.g., Varian, supra note 12, at 422–27. 
132 See FERC, Initial Report on Company-Specific Separate Proceedings and Ge-
neric Reevaluations; Published Natural Gas Price Data; and Enron Trading 
Strategies: Fact-Finding Investigation of Potential Manipulation of Electric 
and Natural Gas Prices 1–2 (2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/ 
enron/fercenron81302rpt.pdf. 
133 Subsequent FERC investigations confirmed that holders of generation scheduled 
unplanned outages in order to create this kind of scarcity. See Final Report on Manipu-
lation, supra note 131, at VI-54 to -55. 
134 Id. 
135 CalPX conducted both “day-ahead” and “real-time” bid auctions. The day-ahead 
market was used to enable both the CalPX and the California ISO to price power for the 
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trades” whereby each party to the transaction agreed to sell the other an 
identical amount of electricity at unusually high or low prices. The pur-
pose of these wash trades was to influence spot market prices on pub-
lished indices; those indices, in turn, were used to settle obligations un-
der futures or other derivatives contracts that the parties to the 
transaction held.136 
 Enron was given credit for devising many of these techniques,137 
but their use in the California electricity market during 2000–2001 was 
widespread. Moreover, oil traders had been using many of these suspect 
techniques for years (including creating and profiting from supply 
squeezes and the provision of false information to publishers of price 
indices).138 Prior to the California electricity crisis, Enron had per-
fected many of these techniques using information it discovered while 
operating a commodities trading platform for others.139 In the wake of 
the California electricity crisis, FERC, the CFTC, and the U.S. Justice 
Department brought civil and criminal enforcement actions against 
participants in that market. Collectively, these enforcement actions re-
sulted in jail time for a few individual defendants, and more than four 
billion dollars in fines, penalties, and disgorgement of profits for about 
twenty-five corporate and individual defendants.140 
                                                                                                                      
 
next day’s delivery and to schedule the electricity flows for the next day. After day-ahead 
bidding, CalPX would then submit the transaction data to California ISO, and California 
ISO balanced load and generation and identified congestion problems. If there were no 
congestion problems, the CalPX’s initial schedule of generation and load would be used. 
If, however, congestion was found, the schedule would be modified using adjustment bid 
processes to charge users for using congested pathways and to compensate those who 
would reschedule load to relieve congestion. The California ISO real-time market was then 
used to balance actual load in real-time to reflect these changes. For a fuller description of 
such techniques, see Final Report on Manipulation, supra note 131, at VI-26 to -30. 
136 In this way, wash trades’ only purpose was to influence indices so as to benefit the 
traders in the settlement of other contracts. See id. at VII-1 to -16. 
137 Post-crisis investigations revealed that Enron did indeed popularize many of these 
techniques. It circulated memos explaining several of the more popular techniques for gam-
ing the California market. These memos are viewable at FERC’s webpage dedicated to the 
California energy crisis. Addressing the 2000–2001 Western Energy Crisis: Enron Trading Memos, 
FERC, http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/wec.asp (last updated Oct. 21, 
2010). 
138 Bower, supra note 52, at 129–52. 
139 See Weaver, supra note 97, at 60. 
140 Largest Fines, Penalties and Refunds Ordered by Federal and State Authorities Against Cor-
porations for Manipulation of the West Coast Energy Market and Natural Gas Price Index Manipu-
lation, Pub. Citizen, http://www.citizen.org/documents/camarketfines.pdf (last visited 
Dec. 2, 2011). There appears to be some disagreement about the total number of en-
forcement actions (and the dollar amount of settlements) arising out of the California 
crisis. In December of 2005, FERC issued a press release claiming that, at that point in 
time, it had overseen more than $6.3 billion in settlements, in cases involving sixty investi-
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 Investigations into the failure of Western power markets during 
the California electricity crisis also revealed attempts to manipulate 
natural gas markets, some of which involved manipulation of prices at 
trading hubs far from California. Between 2002 and 2006, the CFTC 
initiated enforcement actions involving manipulation of natural gas 
futures and forward markets, many of which involved the submission of 
false information about contract prices in an attempt to influence pub-
lished price indices. For example, in one case, the trading arm of El 
Paso Corporation (“El Paso”) was charged with submission of regular 
false information to publishers of gas price indices; these indices were 
used to settle derivatives contracts and to price gas in long-term supply 
contracts between gas suppliers and electric utilities.141 The fraud in-
cluded submission of information about trades that never occurred, as 
well as submission of false trade volumes, and more.142 El Paso settled 
the case and paid a fine of twenty million dollars.143 Similar charges 
were lodged (and settled), for example, against Williams Energy Com-
panies144 and Reliant Energy,145 among many others. For its part, FERC 
brought some corresponding actions against pipeline owners for violat-
ing rules against sharing information with affiliated companies.146 
FERC also initiated, settled, and adjudicated a large number of pro-
ceedings against companies in connection with anticompetitive behav-
                                                                                                                      
gations of market manipulation. News Release, FERC, Commission Reports to Congress on 
Refund Case Status; Notes Final Refunds Affected by $6.3 Billion in Settlements (Dec. 28, 
2005), http://www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/2005/2005-4/12-28-05.asp. 
141 See In re El Paso Merchant Energy, L.P., CFTC Docket No. 03-09, Order Instituting 
Proceedings Pursuant to Sections 6(c) and 6(d) of the Commodity Exchange Act, Making 
Findings and Imposing Remedial Sanctions 2 (Mar. 26, 2003), http://www.cftc.gov/files/ 
enf/03orders/enfelpaso-order.pdf. 
142 Id. 
143 See Press Release, CFTC, El Paso Trading Unit Agrees to Pay $20 Million to Settle 
CFTC Charges of Attempted Manipulation and False Reporting (Mar. 26, 2003), http:// 
www.cftc.gov/opa/enf03/opa4765-03.htm. 
144 See Press Release, CFTC, Williams Companies and Williams Energy Marketing and 
Trading Pay $20 Million to Settle Commodity Futures Trading Commission Charges of 
Attempted Manipulation and False Reporting ( July 29, 2003), http://www.cftc.gov/opa/ 
enf03/opa4824-03.htm. 
145 See Press Release, CFTC, Reliant Energy Services, Inc. to Pay $18 Million to Settle 
Charges of False Reporting and Attempted Manipulation, as Well as Charges of Wash Sales 
(Nov. 25, 2003), http://www.cftc.gov/opa/enf03/opa4869-03.htm. 
146 News Release, FERC, Williams Companies Agree to Pay $7.6 Million to Settle Inves-
tigation of Storage Information Sharing ( June 15, 2005), http://www.ferc.gov/media/ 
news-releases/2005/2005-2/06-15-05-williams.pdf; News Release, FERC, Commission Ac-
cepts $8.1 Million to Resolve Improper Sharing of Gas Storage Inventory Information 
(Aug. 2, 2004), http://www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/2004/2004-3/08-02-04.pdf (in-
volving affiliates of Dominion Resources, Inc.). 
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ior in Western natural gas spot and transmission markets during the 
California electricity crisis. For example, in one proceeding before 
FERC, the California PUC charged El Paso with withholding transmis-
sion capacity in its pipelines to drive up natural gas prices in the peri-
ods immediately before and during the California crisis.147 FERC ap-
proved a settlement of that proceeding in 2003, one that called upon El 
Paso to pay a combination of refunds and fines totaling $1.69 billion.148 
2. Toward a Securities Regulation Approach 
 The California crisis revealed that while FERC had anticipated 
some of the forms of unfair competition that emerged after restructur-
ing (such as discrimination by owners of gas and electric transmission 
lines in favor of their affiliates), it apparently had not foreseen some of 
the ways in which sellers on competitive wholesale markets were able to 
capture and abuse market power, or to influence prices in the spot and 
derivatives markets. Exercising its continuing responsibility to regulate 
competition and ensure that wholesale rates (including market-based 
rates) were “just and reasonable,”149 the agency’s initial response to the 
crisis focused on preventing and deterring wholesale sellers from ac-
quiring and abusing market power. FERC’s previous grants of authority 
to charge market prices for energy had always been conditioned on the 
sellers’ lack of market power; however, long-standing precedent under 
both the FPA and the NGA—the so-called “filed rate doctrine”150— 
prohibited FERC from retroactively penalizing sellers who charged 
market rates that had been “filed” with FERC.151 In the wake of the Cal-
ifornia crisis, courts affirmed the agency’s conclusion that the market 
rates charged by FERC-authorized sellers in the California spot markets 
were “filed rates” for purposes of the filed rate doctrine.152 Therefore, 
in the event a seller authorized to charge market-based rates acquires 
market power—the power to capture scarcity rents by influencing 
                                                                                                                      
147 See Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 105 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,201 (2003) (Order on Contested 
Settlement), available at http://large.stanford.edu/publications/coal/references/ferc/ 
docs/20031114-0380(4507651).pdf. 
148 Id. at 3. 
149 16 U.S.C. § 824e (2006). 
150 The filed rate doctrine has its origins in the case of Keogh v. Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co., 260 
U.S. 156, 161–65 (1922). For a good discussion of the doctrine and its relevance in com-
petitive electricity markets, see generally Jim Rossi, Lowering the Filed Tariff Shield: Judicial 
Enforcement for a Deregulatory Era, 56 Vand. L. Rev. 1591 (2003). 
151 Keogh, 260 U.S. at 165. 
152 California ex rel. Lockyer v. FERC, 383 F.3d 1006, 1011–13 (9th
 
Cir. 2004); see infra 
notes 350–356 and accompanying text. 
160 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:131 
price—the only remedy available to FERC at the time was to revoke that 
seller’s authority to charge market-based rates prospectively. FERC can do 
this in either of two ways: (1) by reimposing cost-based rates for that 
seller, or (2) by imposing rate caps for that seller in the relevant market 
(what it calls “mitigation”).153 
 FERC’s initial reaction to the problem of market power in dysfunc-
tional markets was to try to tighten the conditions under which it 
granted the authority to charge market-based rates and to improve its 
ability to monitor and detect the acquisition of market power by sellers. 
In 2003, it adopted new conditions—called “market behavior rules” — 
applicable to any wholesale seller of electricity authorized to charge 
market-based rates.154 Rule 2, in particular, prohibited “[a]ctions or 
transactions that are without a legitimate business purpose . . . [which] 
. . . foreseeably could manipulate market prices . . . .”155 Next, FERC 
sought to strengthen the checks it used to determine whether a seller 
has market power, both before any grant of authority to charge market-
based rates and afterward: in April 2004, the agency adopted new 
“market power screens” to assess generators’ or sellers’ market 
power.156 The new screens examined not only a seller’s market share, 
but also the question of whether it is a “pivotal supplier” within its geo-
                                                                                                                      
153 FERC can penalize and/or order refunds only when a seller’s actions contradict the 
conditions under which it was granted authority to charge market-based rates. Indeed, 
most of the enforcement proceedings that arose out of the California crisis and resulted in 
refunds and penalties fell into this latter category. See infra notes 347–360 and accompany-
ing text. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 added language making this authority more ex-
plicit. See 16 U.S.C. § 824e(e)(2). 
154 Order Amending Market-Based Rate Tariffs and Authorizations, Investigation of 
Terms and Conditions of Public Utility Market-Based Rate Authorizations, 105 F.E.R.C. 
¶¶ 61,218, 62,142 (Nov. 17, 2003), reh’g denied, 107 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,175 (May 19, 2004) [here-
inafter Market Behavior Rules]. 
155 Id. ¶ 62,147. In its order finalizing the market behavior rules, FERC explained that 
a seller might be found to be in violation of the anti-manipulation restrictions contained in 
Rule 2 if it physically withheld capacity from the market “for the purpose of raising the 
sales price obtainable by other units participating in the market . . . .” Id. ¶¶ 62,147–48. 
The order was ambiguous when it came to the legality of merely capturing large scarcity 
rents in dysfunctional markets, like California’s 2000–2001 electricity markets. The agency 
considered adopting a provision that would prohibit sellers from bidding such high prices 
into spot markets that the bid would act so as to raise the market clearing price. FERC 
rejected the adoption of that language, but expressly declined to rule that this kind of 
“economic withholding” does not constitute manipulation in violation of the market be-
havior rules. Id. ¶¶ 62,145, 62,155–56. 
156 See News Release, FERC, Commission Revises Interim Generation Market Power 
Screen and Mitigation Policy; Seeks Public Input on Future Market Power Rulemaking 1–2 
(Apr. 14, 2004), http://www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/2004/2004-2/04-14-04-market. 
pdf. 
2012] Energy Market Regulation and the Problem of Market Power 161 
graphic markets during times of peak demand.157 Later that same year, 
FERC took action to strengthen its ability to detect the acquisition of 
market power by requiring sellers to report changes in their market 
power status,158 and began revoking the authority to charge market-
based rates from sellers who could not satisfy the agency’s new market 
ow
tion.164 FERC indicated that it would incorporate case law interpreting 
     
p er screens.159 
 Congress weighed in on the question of how to police competition 
in energy markets with the passage of the Energy Policy Act of 2005. 
Sections 315 and 1283 of the public law amended the FPA and NGA, 
respectively, and directed FERC to adopt an approach to regulating 
energy markets that focuses on fraud, and prohibits the use of “any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance”160 by market partici-
pants. This language was explicitly borrowed from section 10(b) of the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.161 The statute also incorporated 
into the new regulatory regime the same scienter requirements found 
in the securities laws.162 In early 2006, FERC issued its Order 670,163 
making it illegal to “use or employ any device, scheme, or artifice to 
defraud” or to engage in “any act, practice, or course of business that 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any entity” in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of energy subject to FERC jurisdic-
                                                                                                                 
157 Id. This screen was aimed directly at the problem that arose in California: namely, 
the ability of sellers who did not engage in manipulation or withholding of supply to 
command very high rates for their power simply because of scarcity and the price inelastic-
ity o
2, 70 Fed. Reg. 8253, 8253–54 (FERC Feb. 10, 2005) (to be 
cod
 power mitigation, or accept default 
cost
-1 (2006)); § 1283, 119 Stat. at 979–80 (codified as amended 
at 1
2005 criminalize “willful and knowing” violations. See 15 U.S.C. § 717c-1; 
16 U
o. 670, 71 Fed. Reg. 4244, 
4246 e codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 1c). 
164 18 C.F.R. § 1c.2 (2011). 
f demand. See id. 
158 Reporting Requirement for Changes in Status for Public Utilities with Market-Based 
Rate Authority, Order No. 65
ified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). 
159 See News Release, FERC, Commission Acts on Market-Based Rate Filings, Advances 
New Market Oversight Policy (Dec. 15, 2004), http://www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/ 
2004/2004-4/12-15-04-mbr.pdf (ordering companies that failed the indicative screens to 
file a delivered price test, propose case-specific market
-based rates and file cost support for those rates). 
160 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 315, 119 Stat. 594, 691 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 717c
6 U.S.C. § 824v (2006)). 
161 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). 
162 Like section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, sections 315 and 1283 of the En-
ergy Policy Act of 
.S.C. § 824v. 
163 Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation, Order N
 (FERC Jan. 19, 2006) (to b
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section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5165 into its understanding of this new rule, 
where appropriate and relevant.166 
 This new language seems to exclude from its coverage the mere use 
of innocently acquired market power (in dysfunctional markets like Cal-
ifornia’s 2000–2001 markets) to capture scarcity rents (no matter how 
dysfunctional the market), and raised the question of whether physical 
withholding or economic withholding would be covered by the rule. 
FERC answered some of these questions shortly after issuing Order 670 
when it rescinded Rule 2 of its market behavior rules. FERC specifically 
rejected the notion that Rule 2 had been aimed at curbing market pow-
er or at anticompetitive conduct not involving deception and fraud: 
[M]arket power is a structural issue to be remedied, not by 
behavioral prohibitions, but by processes to identify and, 
where necessary, mitigate market power that a tariff applicant 
may possess or acquire. This occurs in the screening process 
before the Commission grants an application for market-
based rate authority, on consideration of changes in the sel-
ler’s status or operations, and in the triennial review of mar-
ket-based rate authorization . . . .167 
The language in Order 670 addressing fraud and manipulation does 
cover many of the other forms of anticompetitive conduct witnessed in 
the California markets, including the use of wash trades, the artificial 
creation and relief of transmission congestion, various forms of collu-
sion, and the submission of false information.168 
 Since the implementation of this new approach borrowed from 
securities regulation, FERC has continued to scrutinize market condi-
tions in electric and gas markets,169 and has revoked some sellers’ au-
                                                                                                                      
 
165 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011). 
166 See News Release, FERC, Commission Finalizes Rule Barring Market Manipulation 2 
( Jan. 19, 2006), http://www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/2006/2006-1/01-19-06-M-1.pdf. 
167 FERC, Docket No. EL06-16-000, Order Revising Market-Based Rate Tariffs and Au-
thorizations, Investigation of the Terms and Conditions of Public Utility Market-Based Rate 
Authorizations 10 (Feb. 16, 2006), http://www.ferc.gov/whats-new/comm-meet/021606/E-
4.pdf. As the excerpt implies, sellers are required to notify the agency of changes in their 
status, meaning changes that implicate the extent to which they can exert market power. 
FERC also engages in a separate triennial review of firms’ markets and market power. See id. 
at 10, 21. 
168 See Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation, Order No. 670, 71 Fed. Reg. at 
4254. 
169 Specifically, on June 21, 2007, FERC issued its Order 697, which fine-tuned its ap-
proach to preventing and detecting market power and other anticompetitive practices in 
electricity markets. Market-Based Rates for Wholesale Sales of Electric Energy, Capacity 
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thority to charge market-based rates.170 In 2007, FERC and the CFTC 
began to coordinate their efforts to manage enforcement in energy 
markets.171 The agencies brought a coordinated enforcement action 
against Amaranth, a hedge fund charged with manipulating the price of 
NYMEX natural gas futures in order to influence the settlement prices 
on other contracts it held.172 That case was settled in 2009 for $7.5 mil-
lion.173 The CFTC brought additional actions against the following enti-
ties: (1) BP for attempting to corner the propane market, resulting in 
the imposition of a $303 million fine and deferred criminal prosecution 
by the U.S. Department of Justice;174 (2) ConAgra Trade Group for false 
reporting of trades on the NYMEX crude oil exchange, a case that was 
settled for $12 million;175 and (3) Cantor Fitzgerald for fraudulent wash 
sales in gasoline markets, which was settled with the payment of a 
$100,000 fine.176 In another enforcement action, FERC charged Energy 
Transfer Partners with attempts to manipulate the price of natural gas 
traded at the Houston Ship Channel.177 The case was settled, and En-
                                                                                                                      
and Ancillary Services by Public Utilities, Order No. 697, 72 Fed. Reg. 72,239, 72,242 
(FERC Dec. 20, 2007) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). 
170 See, e.g., News Release, FERC, Commission Revokes Companies’ Market-Based 
Rates, Terminates 206 Proceeding for N.M. Utility’s Control Area (Apr. 20, 2006), http:// 
www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/2006/2006-2/04-20-06-E-12.pdf; News Release, FERC, 
Eight Companies’ Market-Based Rate Authority Revoked, Six Others Put on Notice; 
SCE&G’s Mitigation Conditionally Accepted, CLECO’s Section 206 Proceeding Termi-
nated (Feb. 16, 2006), http://www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/2006/2006-1/02-16-06-eqr. 
pdf. 
171 After the passage of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, the CFTC and FERC signed a 
memorandum of understanding aimed at coordinating their regulation of energy markets. 
News Release, FERC, FERC Chairman Kelliher and CFTC Chairman Jeffery Sign MOU on 
Information Sharing, Confidentiality (Oct. 12, 2005), http://www.ferc.gov/media/news-
releases/2005/2005-4/10-12-05.pdf. 
172 See Press Release, CFTC, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Charges 
Hedge Fund Amaranth and Its Former Head Energy Trader, Brian Hunter, with At-
tempted Manipulation of the Price of Natural Gas Futures ( July 25, 2007), http://www. 
cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr5359-07. 
173 See Press Release, CFTC, Amaranth Entities Ordered to Pay a $7.5 Million Civil Fine 
in CFTC Action Alleging Attempted Manipulation of Natural Gas Futures Prices (Aug. 12, 
2009), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr5692-09 [hereinafter Amaranth]; 
News Release, FERC, FERC Approves $7.5 Million Civil Penalty in Amaranth Case (Aug. 
12, 2009), http://www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/2009/2009-3/08-12-09.pdf. 
174 See Press Release, CFTC, BP Agrees to Pay a Total of $303 Million in Sanctions to 
Settle Charges of Manipulation and Attempted Manipulation in the Propane Market (Oct. 
25, 2007), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr5405-07. 
175 ConAgra Trade Grp., Inc. C.F.T.C. Docket No. 10-14, at 3–5 (Aug. 16, 2010). 
176 Cantor Fitzgerald & Co., C.F.T.C. Docket No. 11-08, at 3–6 (Feb. 22, 2011). 
177 See FERC, Fact Sheet, Docket No. IN06-3-002, Energy Transfer Partners, L.P., et al. 
(ETP) (2007), http://www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/2007/2007-3/07-26-07-etp-fs.pdf. 
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ergy Transfer Partners agreed to pay a total of $30 million in fines and 
other costs.178 
 Meanwhile, in organized electricity markets, FERC has enlisted the 
ISOs and RTOs to monitor these markets and detect the existence of 
market power in individual firms, with FERC oversight.179 Those mar-
ket monitoring efforts focus not only on the spot price of electricity, but 
also on electric transmission capacity markets and new ISO/RTO-
operated markets for new electric generating capacity.180 FERC also 
monitors markets for the physical delivery of natural gas and for natu-
ral gas transmission capacity. 
C. Oil and Gas Prices and Derivatives Markets 
 As the litigation produced by the California crisis was wending its 
way toward a conclusion, prices in crude oil markets were climbing 
steadily, eventually reaching unprecedented levels in 2007 and early 
2008, before falling precipitously later that year. Figure 1 summarizes 
the bumpy trajectory of oil prices over the last decade. 
 
Figure 1: Monthly Oil Prices, 2000–2010 ($/barrel)181 
                                                                                                                      
178 See News Release, FERC, FERC Approves Record $30 Million Settlement in ETP 
Market Manipulation Case (Sept. 21, 2009) [hereinafter Market Manipulation Case], 
http://www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/2009/2009-3/09-21-09.pdf. 
179 Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Electric Markets, Order No. 719, 
73 Fed. Reg. 64,100, 64,101–02 (FERC Oct. 28, 2008) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). 
180 These so-called “capacity markets” were created by some transmission organizations 
to try to provide additional incentives for the construction of new generating capacity. For 
a description of the New York ISO’s capacity markets, see About NYISO: The Capacity Market, 
N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, http://www.nyiso.com/public/about_nyiso/understanding_ 
the_markets/capacity_market/index.jsp (last visited Dec. 2, 2011). 
181 Spot Prices for Crude Oil and Petroleum Products, U.S. Energy Info. Admin., http://www. 
eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_spt_s1_w.htm (click “download series history,” which opens excel 
spreadsheet, and then click “Data 1”) (last updated Dec. 14, 2011). 
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Natural gas prices did not experience quite so steady and drastic a rise, 
but were characterized by high peaks and considerable volatility over 
the same period. Indeed, natural gas prices have been notoriously vola-
tile since their deregulation under the NGPA. This is because there is 
more variation in the seasonal demand for natural gas, storage oppor-
tunities are limited,182 and consumer price elasticities of demand for 
natural gas are low,183 particularly where gas is used for home heating. 
Figure 2 shows that winter peak prices did indeed spike to very high 
levels in the years prior to the oil price crash in 2008. 
 
Figure 2: Monthly Price of Natural Gas at Henry Hub ($/million Btu)184 
 What accounts for this price behavior? Were these price increases 
driven primarily by the forces of supply and demand? Or were these 
increases driven more by the participation of banks and other “non-
commercial” traders in energy markets? Were speculators or other so-
phisticated traders manipulating these markets so as to take profits at 
the expense of energy companies and, ultimately, energy consumers?185 
                                                                                                                      
 
182 See Bailey, supra note 83, § 5.01[2]. 
183 For studies estimating the price elasticity of energy demand, see generally Steven H. 
Wade, Price Responsiveness in the AEO2003 NEMS Residential and Commercial Buildings Sector 
Models, U.S. Energy Info. Admin., http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/analysispaper/elasticity/ 
(last visited Nov. 21, 2011). 
184 Dow Jones & Co., Natural Gas Price Index: Henry Hub, LA—10 Year Chart, Forecast-
Chart.com, http://www.forecast-chart.com/chart-natural-gas.html (last updated Nov. 28, 
2011). 
185 There is some disagreement over the proper definition of “speculators” or “specu-
lation” in this context. The CFTC applies the term “noncommercial” to all forms of par-
ticipation by parties who are not actually attempting to hedge price risk. Others would 
distinguish between those who arbitrage the difference between concurrent prices in two 
distinct markets and those who are speculating on future price (neither hedging nor arbi-
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 Prompted by the concerns of constituents, Congress held hearings 
to investigate the run-up in energy prices prior to the 2008 crash.186 In 
those hearings, witnesses and committee members expressed concerns 
that oil industry mergers had permitted oil companies to exert market 
power over oil and gas prices,187 and that the participation of specula-
tors in energy markets may be driving prices to “artificially” high lev-
els.188 In one hearing, the subcommittee chairman made specific men-
tion of the cases brought against BP, Amaranth, and Energy Transfer 
Partners, noting that it was “Enron all over again.”189 Congress’s suspi-
cion of the role of speculators in driving up energy prices was fed by a 
2006 Senate report concluding that extensive participation by non-
commercial entities in oil and gas futures markets was playing a signifi-
cant role in propping up demand, and therefore prices, in physical en-
ergy markets.190 
                                                                                                                      
traging). In 1982, the CFTC reports began classifying entities in the futures markets as 
either commercial or noncommercial traders. Commercial traders were those that had 
commercial activity or physical dealing with the underlying commodity and faced price 
risks in cash markets that were hedged in futures markets. Noncommercial traders, or 
speculators, were those who took an opposite position to commercial traders. CFTC, Staff 
Report on Commodity Swap Dealers & Index Traders with Commission Recommen-
dations 1–2 (2008) [hereinafter Staff Report on Commodity Swap Dealers], available 
at http://www.loe.org/images/content/080919/cftcstaffreportonswapdealers09.pdf. Since 
September 2009, the CFTC’s Commitment of Traders Report has separated traders into 
four categories rather than classifying them as either commercial or noncommercial. 
Commercial traders are now split between “traditional” commercials (oil dealers, energy 
producers, refiners, and merchants, etc.) and commodity swap dealers, which includes 
most commodity index traders. Noncommercial traders are now split into managed money 
traders (hedge funds) and “other non-commercial traders” that have reportable positions. 
Bahattin Büyükşahin & Michel A. Robe, Does “Paper Oil” Matter? Energy Markets’ Finan-
cialization and Equity-Commodity Co-Movements 9–10 (Feb. 15, 2011) (unpublished ma-
nuscript), available at http://www.iadb.org/document.cfm?id=35779678. 
186 In convening a hearing before the House of Representatives Committee on Energy 
and Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Chairman Bart Stupak 
acknowledged that the hearing was driven by the concerns of constituents, noting, “I was 
at a funeral last Saturday, and when the monsignor greeted me, he said, ‘My God, Bart, 
you have to do something about these gas prices.’” Gasoline Prices, Oil Company Profits and 
the American Consumer: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. 
Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 110th Cong. 1 (2007) (statement of Bart Stupak, Chairman). 
187 Id. at 13, 74. 
188 See Energy Speculation: Is Greater Regulation Necessary to Stop Price Manipulation?: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 110th 
Cong. 3 (2007) (statement of Bart Stupak, Chairman) [hereinafter Energy Speculation]. 
189 Id. at 3–4. 
190 Staff of Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. 
& Gov’t Affairs, 109th Cong., The Role of Market Speculation in Rising Oil and 
Gas Prices: A Need to Put the Cop Back on the Beat 2 (Comm. Print 2006) (repro-
duced in Energy Speculation, supra note 188, at 218). 
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 Certainly, there is a relationship between derivatives markets and 
physical markets. When an energy derivative contract culminates in the 
execution of a sale on spot markets, that sale takes place at the contract 
price. Likewise, if commercial traders see futures prices going up, that 
may influence the amount they are willing to pay or demand for energy 
in spot markets. In this way, derivatives prices can influence spot market 
prices. Theoretically, however, a trader’s success in the derivatives mar-
ket ought to be a function of how well that trader predicts future prices 
in physical markets. For every participant betting on a price increase in 
the future, there is a corresponding counterparty betting on a de-
crease. In this way, over the long run, the forces of supply and demand 
in the physical markets ought to discipline futures markets—not the 
other way around. It is at least conceptually possible, however, that the 
participation of noncommercial traders in futures markets could over-
whelm market fundamentals in either of two ways. First, as we have 
noted, traders could try to distort prices by reporting fraudulent trades 
or attempting to corner the market. Second, noncommercial traders 
could become irrationally exuberant about energy commodities: that is, 
they could be attracted to the market based upon an irrational or inac-
curate understanding of market fundamentals, thereby distorting pric-
es.191 Indeed, the increase in energy prices prior to the 2008 collapse 
corresponded to a significant increase in participation by noncommer-
cial traders in futures markets,192 leading to the inference that those 
traders may have contributed to the increase. In the words of one for-
mer oil trader and CNBC contributor, “a good trader never bothers 
much with what the asset he is trading is truly worth—the only thing 
that matters is that he can sell it to someone else for more than what he 
paid,” and the “dumb money” was chasing energy prior to 2008.193 
 There is substantial evidence that speculative bubbles can persist in 
markets:194 behavioral finance195 and behavioral economics196 have pro-
                                                                                                                      
 
191 This kind of participation by noncommercial traders would only distort prices if the 
exuberance or error was predominantly in one direction or the other—that is, if these 
traders were predominately betting on either a price increase or a price decrease. For ex-
ample, if most new investors who were attracted to oil futures markets were convinced 
(incorrectly) that the price of oil in future spot markets was likely to grow at a substantial 
rate, their sustained participation in futures markets could push prices in those markets 
beyond levels explained by underlying supply and demand for oil. 
192 See Trends in Energy Derivatives, supra note 122, at 18 fig.3. 
193 Dan Dicker, Oil’s Endless Bid: Taming the Unreliable Price of Oil to Cure 
Our Economy 66–74, 165 (2011). 
194 See, e.g., J. Bradford De Long et al., Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets, 98 J. Pol. 
Econ. 703, 735 (1990) (concluding that “noise trading can lead to a large divergence be-
tween market prices and fundamental values”); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The 
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duced theories that help explain why bubbles can be sustained over 
time, even in supposedly efficient markets.197 One theory, which is 
based in large part upon the representativeness heuristic established by 
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky,198 is that bubbles arise because 
investors extrapolate past outcomes too far into the future, believing 
that excellent past performance will continue indefinitely.199 This error 
may be compounded by groupthink,200 as “[c]ontagious ‘exuberance’ 
                                                                                                                      
 
Limits of Arbitrage, 42 J. Finance 35, 54 (1997) (concluding that when prices diverge from 
fundamental values there are often many limitations that prevent arbitrageurs from effec-
tively profiting from that gap, meaning that bubbles may persist). Milton Friedman has 
argued that speculative bubbles are impossible because people who buy high and sell low 
would be quickly wiped out. Milton Friedman, The Case for Flexible Exchange Rate, in Es-
says in Positive Economics 157 (1953). A commentator has observed that Friedman’s 
view “points to a sheltered existence.” John Plender, On Bubbles, Balzac and the Dismal Sci-
ence, Fin. Times (London), Dec. 27, 2004, at 18. 
195 See, e.g., Hersh Shefrin, Beyond Greed and Fear: Understanding Behavioral 
Finance and the Psychology of Investing 299–308 (2000); Lars Tvede, The Psy-
chology of Finance 108–12 (1999); 2 Advances in Behavioral Finance 424 (Richard 
H. Thaler, ed., 2005). 
196 See, e.g., Richard H. Thaler, Quasi-Rational Economics, at xi–xxii (1991); Ad-
vances in Behavioral Economics 3–14 (Colin Camerer et al. eds. 2004); Behavioral 
Economics and Its Applications 1–6 (Peter Diamond & Hannu Vartiainen eds., 2007). 
197 Behavioral economics and behavioral finance represent applications of behavioral 
psychology principles to economic behavior. See generally Choices, Values, and Frames 
(Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000) (discussing several major theories of deci-
sion-making behavior); Heuristics & Biases (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds, 2002) (discuss-
ing the theory of judgment based on simplified heuristics); Research on Judgment and 
Decision Making: Currents, Connections, and Controversies (William M. Goldstein 
& Robin M. Hogarth eds., 1997) (discussing the intellectual foundation of several research 
traditions in the study of judgment and decision making). 
198 Pursuant to the representativeness heuristic, people tend to extrapolate too much 
from a small sample size, especially if the sample is salient to them. Thus, someone might 
believe that if Google stock has outpaced the stock market for the past two years, it will 
continue to do so, well into the future. See Scott Plous, The Psychology of Judgment 
and Decision Making 109–20 (1993) (describing the “representativeness heuristic”). 
199 See, e.g., Nicholas Barberis & Andrei Shleifer, Style Investing, 68 J. Fin. Econ. 161, 
190 (2003) (arguing that asset “[p]rices deviate substantially from fundamental values as 
[investment] styles become popular or unpopular”); Nicholas Barberis, Andrei Shleifer & 
Robert Vishny, A Model of Investor Sentiment, 49 J. Fin. Econ. 307, 308–09 (1998) (relying on 
the representativeness heuristic to suggest that “investors might classify some stocks as 
growth stocks based on a history of consistent earnings growth, ignoring the likelihood 
that there are very few companies that just keep growing[,]” and also relying on the “con-
servatism” principle to suggest that investors update their beliefs very slowly in the face of 
new evidence); Josef Lakonishok, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Contrarian Invest-
ment, Extrapolation, and Risk, 49 J. Finance 1541, 1551, 1564, 1574 (1994) (noting evidence 
that people often do not understand reversion to the mean and therefore believe that 
stocks that have performed above average in the past will continue to do so, and that this 
consistent overestimation can persist for a long time). 
200 David Tuckett, Addressing the Psychology of Financial Markets, Economics: The Open-
Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, Nov. 20, 2009, at 1–3, http://www.economics-
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can . . . seize asset markets, leading to evidence-resistant investment 
frenzies.”201 Another theory is based on the notion of overconfidence, 
which is well established in human decision making generally202 and in 
investing behavior specifically.203 The notion here is that when investors 
research a stock or asset, they tend to overvalue the private information 
that they generate and undervalue the public information that comes 
from the market.204 As they profit during a rising market, investors may 
become more and more confident. Attribution errors or biases lead 
people to think that their investment successes are due to their own 
abilities.205 These investors may completely change the way they think 
about themselves “so that their self-esteem [is] promoted by a sense that 
they [are] smart investors.”206 Their subsequent decision making, then, 
can be based on how their mind frames the circumstances.207 For ex-
                                                                                                                      
ejournal.org/economics/journalarticles/2009-40 (for PDF, click “Download (pdf, 165.1 
kB)”). Groupthink involves, in part, cohesive groups (such as investors sharing belief in a 
particular strategy) reinforcing each others’ thinking and ignoring negative information 
by viewing the deliverers of bad news as people who “just don’t get it.” See Irving L. Janis, 
Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and 
Fiascoes 1–5 (1972). 
201 Roland Bénabou, Groupthink: Collective Delusions in Organizations and Markets 1 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14764, 2008). 
202 See Plous, supra note 198, at 222–27. 
203 See Max. H. Bazerman, Judgment in Managerial Decision Making 138–40 (7th 
ed. 2009) (citing several research studies analyzing the success of various investment strat-
egies); see also Robert J. Shiller, Irrational Exuberance 145 (2000) (“Overconfidence 
in judgments can at times influence people to believe that they know when a market move 
will take place, even if they generally believe as an intellectual matter that stock prices are 
not forecastable.”). 
204 See Kent Daniel, David Hirshleifer & Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, Investor Psychology 
and Security Market Under- and Overreactions, 53 J. Finance 1839, 1865–66 (1998) (creating 
models to explain why investors sometimes overreact to new information and other times 
underreact). 
205 See generally Kent Daniel et al., A Theory of Overconfidence, Self-Attribution, and Se-
curity Market Under- and Over-reactions (Feb. 19, 1997) (unpublished manuscript), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2017 (analyzing self-attribution bias 
by investors). 
206 George A. Akerlof & Robert J. Shiller, Animal Spirits: How Human Psy-
chology Drives the Economy, and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism 154 
(2009); Shiller, supra note 203, at 44, 60–64, 67 (describing bubbles as “naturally occur-
ring Ponzi schemes” in that overconfident investors’ initial success brings more irrationally 
exuberant investors into the market); see also Mitchell Zuckoff, Ponzi’s Scheme: The 
True Story of a Financial Legend 113–14 (2005). 
207 See Bazerman, supra note 203, at 46–58 (regarding framing effects generally). See 
generally Richard H. Thaler, Mental Accounting Matters, 12 J. Behav. Decision Making 183 
(1999) (explaining how money is not completely fungible in human decision making and 
how humans often make different decisions based upon which “pocket” they view the 
money as belonging in; for example, they are more likely to spend frivolously if the money 
was won in a lottery than if it was earned by their labors). 
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ample, gamblers in Las Vegas who have just won money are more likely 
to take riskier bets than gamblers who have just lost money;208 similarly, 
investors who have done well investing in a stock or asset feel like their 
profits are “house money” and they are more likely to take risks continu-
ing to invest in that stock or asset thereby bidding it up to further 
heights.209 A single bias such as overconfidence can get most noise trad-
ers pointing in a single direction;210 alternatively, other investors may 
know intellectually that the asset must be overvalued, but they anticipate 
nevertheless that the values will continue to rise based on their under-
standing of others’ views.211 All of these phenomena can exacerbate 
changes212 of any category or subcategory of traders systematically af-
                                                                                                                     
bubbles. 
 Nonetheless, many of the studies of the 2003–2008 energy market 
price spikes concluded that price increases were driven primarily by the 
forces of supply and demand. In July 2008, a special task force con-
vened by the CFTC published its analysis of crude oil prices, conclud-
ing that “there is no statistically significant evidence that the position 
 
 
208 See generally Richard H. Thaler & Eric J. Johnson, Gambling with the House Money and 
Trying to Break Even: The Effects of Prior Outcomes on Risky Choice, 36 Mgmt. Sci. 643 (1990) 
(demonstrating “house money” effects). 
209 See, e.g., Nicholas Barberis, Ming Huang & Tano Santos, Prospect Theory and Asset 
Prices, Q.J. Economics 1, 2, 4, 48 (2001) (proposing, consistent with Kahneman and Tver-
sky’s prospect theory, that people who have been successful in their investing will become 
less risk averse, and noting that Kahneman and Tversky’s model’s predictions “exhibit 
phenomena very similar to what has been observed in historical data”). 
210 See Andrei Shleifer, Inefficient Markets: An Introduction to Behavioral 
Finance 173–74 (2000). There is evidence that less experienced investors may be more 
prone to some of these investing errors that lead to bubbles than are more experienced 
investors. See Robin Greenwood & Stefan Nagel, Inexperienced Investors and Bubbles 2–3, 
27 ( June 9, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
963050. That said, there is also plenty of evidence that experts are just as prone as nonex-
perts to many of the heuristics and biases that plague human attempts at rational decision 
making, such as overconfidence. See Robert A. Prentice, Chicago Man, K-T Man, and the 
Future of Behavioral Law and Economics, 56 Vand. L. Rev. 1663, 1726–29 (2003). 
211 Ravi Dhar & William N. Goetzmann, Bubble Investors: What Were They Thinking? 28–
30 (Yale Int’l Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper No. 06-22, 2006), available at http://ssrn. 
com/abstract=683366 (based on surveys of investors during the dot.com boom). This is a 
so-called rational bubble, but usually the participants irrationally believe that they can be 
the last person off the ship before it sinks. For example, a London banker justified his 
participation in the South Sea Bubble by explaining that “when the rest of the world are 
[sic] mad, we must imitate them [sic] in some measure.” John Carswell, The South Sea 
Bubble 161 (1960). 
212 In commodities trading parlance, a “position” is the type and size of the trader’s 
holdings in a particular derivative. For example, a trader who has purchased futures based 
on the expectation that prices will go up (the right to purchase the commodity at a price 
certain in the future) is said to have taken a “long position.” One who purchases futures 
on the expectation that prices will go down (the right to sell the commodity price at a 
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fect prices,”213 and that price increases prior to the 2008 crash were 
“largely due to fundamental supply and demand factors.”214 Those ba-
sic conclusions were echoed in studies by the Brookings Institution,215 
and the GAO.216 These studies noted that over the relevant period, the 
growth in demand for oil outpaced growth in supply,217 and spare pro-
duction capacity shrunk.218 Some pointed to the price (in)elasticity of 
demand for oil as an exacerbating factor.219 Inventories declined dur-
ing the relevant period, further implying market-driven prices.220 Fur-
thermore, the American dollar, the currency in which oil prices are typ-
ically denominated, lost value during this period,221 which contributed 
to the price increase. The 2008 fall in oil prices also corresponded with 
an economic downturn, further supporting the connection between 
demand for the physical product and its price.222 The GAO’s analysis of 
this issue is fairly typical: citing the collective wisdom of the CFTC, 
FERC, investment banks, and others. The GAO seems to conclude that 
it was very unlikely that a speculative bubble could be sustained for a 
                                                                                                                      
price certain in the future) is said to have taken a “short position.” Either position can be 
large (high-volume) or small (low-volume). 
213 Interagency Task Force on Commodity Mkts., Interim Report on Crude Oil 31 
(2008) [hereinafter ITF Interim Report], available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/ 
public/@newsroom/documents/file/itfinterimreportoncrudeoil0708.pdf. 
214 Id. at 3. 
215 James D. Hamilton, Causes and Consequences of the Oil Shock of 2007–08, Brookings Pa-
pers on Econ. Activity, Spring 2009, at 215, 225–34, available at http://www.brookings. 
edu/~/media/Files/Programs/ES/BPEA/2009_spring_bpea_papers/2009a_bpea_hamil- 
ton.pdf. 
216 Trends in Energy Derivatives, supra note 122, at 19. 
217 Id. at 21 (citing unspecified data from the EIA); ITF Interim Report, supra note 
213, at 11–13; Hamilton, supra note 215, at 225–34. 
218 Trends in Energy Derivatives, supra note 122, at 21; ITF Interim Report, supra 
note 213, at 11–13; Hamilton, supra note 215, at 225–28. 
219 ITF Interim Report, supra note 213, at 14; Hamilton, supra note 215, at 228–34. 
220 Ricardo J. Caballero, Emmanuel Farhi & Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, Financial Crash, 
Commodity Prices, and Global Imbalances, Brookings Papers on Econ. Activity, Fall 2008, at 
1, 11, available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/ES/BPEA/2008_ 
fall_bpea_papers/2008b_bpea_caballero.pdf; see also ITF Interim Report, supra note 213, at 
4. 
221 Trends in Energy Derivatives, supra note 122, at 21; ITF Interim Report, supra 
note 213, at 14–15; Kenneth B. Medlock, III & Amy Myers Jaffe, Who Is in the Oil Futures 
Market and How Has It Changed? 15–17 ( James A. Baker Inst. for Pub. Policy, Rice Univ., 
Working Paper, Aug. 26, 2009) (arguing that investors were attracted to oil-linked index 
funds as a way to escape the declining value of the dollar, causing a “vicious cycle” in which 
“continually rising oil prices feed the US trade deficit”). 
222 After using a mathematical model to analyze speculators’ likely role, one author 
concludes that speculators may have had a role, but did not play the central role, in the 
price increases. Hamilton, supra note 215, at 234–40. 
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period of time sufficient to explain the long climb in prices leading up 
to the 2008 crash.223 
 None of these studies entirely discounted the effects of the partici-
pation of noncommercial traders, however.224 To the contrary, most 
noted how difficult it is to determine true underlying demand in the 
midst of a bubble. There were dissenters who ascribed a larger role to 
speculators and speculation in driving up energy prices.225 Significantly, 
price spikes provoked a broader discussion about derivatives markets 
generally, and led many in the energy policy community to conclude 
that there was, indeed an ongoing potential for manipulation of those 
markets, at least in the short-term due to gaps in the regulatory regime. 
Consequently, Congress took a series of steps to close those gaps, in 
part by embracing once again the securities regulation approach for 
energy markets. 
 The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA), ad-
dressed manipulation of petroleum markets in much the same way 
Congress had earlier addressed manipulation of electric and gas mar-
kets: namely, by prohibiting the use of any “manipulative or deceptive 
device or contrivance” in wholesale petroleum transactions,226 and pro-
hibiting “false or misleading” reporting of information about wholesale 
                                                                                                                      
223 See Trends in Energy Derivatives, supra note 122, at 21–24; see also Hamilton, su-
pra note 215, at 240; James D. Hamilton, Understanding Crude Oil Prices 14–16 (Univ. of Cal. 
Energy Inst., Working Paper, June 2008) (paper on file with authors) (noting that an on-
going speculative price bubble would have to be matched by an unsustainable continuous 
inventory accumulation or cuts in production, in which case one might better attribute the 
price increase to the reduced supply). But cf. Energy Speculation, supra note 188, at 15 (tes-
timony of Michael Greenberger, law professor) (seeming to endorse the conclusions of a 
Senate staff report that noncommercial traders have used trading in exempt OTC markets 
to “drive up needlessly the price of energy commodities over what economic fundamentals 
dictate”); Medlock & Jaffe, supra note 221, at 11–12 (arguing that, after January 2006, lev-
els of noncommercial participation in futures markets became a leading indicator of price, 
and that lags in supply increases can allow speculative bubbles to persist, “at least for short 
periods of time”). 
224 “[T]he speed and magnitude of the price collapse leads one to give serious consid-
eration to the alternative hypothesis that this episode represents a speculative price bubble 
that subsequently popped.” Hamilton, supra note 215, at 16. An energy analyst also as-
cribes the price increases of the early 2000s to supply-demand imbalances. See Daniel Yer-
gin, The Quest: Energy, Security, and the Remaking of the Modern World 160–62 
(2011). 
225 See, e.g., FERC, 2008 State of the Markets Report 6–9, 25–33 (2009), available at 
http://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/reports-analyses/st-mkt-ovr/2008-som-final.pdf (con-
cluding that “[p]hysical fundamentals alone cannot explain natural gas prices,” and pointing 
to the participation of speculators (though not “manipulation”) as a driver of prices). 
226 42 U.S.C. § 17301 (Supp. III 2010). 
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petroleum transactions, including price information.227 Next, Congress 
closed part of the Enron loophole in its May 2008 farm bill, subjecting 
OTC trading of formerly exempt energy derivatives on electronic trad-
ing facilities to CFTC regulation.228 This brought forward contracts and 
other derivatives traded on the ICE within the CFTC’s regulatory juris-
diction.229 
 Finally, in 2010, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Re-
form and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”), Title VII of this 
Act closed what had become known as the “swaps loophole.”230 Prior to 
the legislation, swaps dealers had been selling investors contracts the 
returns of which were tied to (energy) commodity price indices, expos-
ing the dealers to significant price risk. To hedge that risk, swaps deal-
ers purchased exchange traded futures contracts in the corresponding 
commodities. Reasoning that swaps dealers in this instance were acting 
as hedgers—that is, that they needed to hedge commodity price risk 
( just as commercial traders do)—the CFTC and NYMEX had extended 
to swaps dealers the same exemptions from position limits that they 
extended to commercial traders.231 This enabled noncommercial trad-
ers to speculate on energy prices in much larger volumes than they 
would have otherwise been able, but for the exemptions. Dodd-Frank 
required standardized swaps to be traded on regulated exchanges, and 
directed the CFTC to set position limits and margin requirements232 
for swaps transactions. 
                                                                                                                     
 The CFTC estimates that implementation of the requirements of 
Dodd-Frank will require many tens of rulemakings, only some of which 
 
227 Id. § 17302. The U.S. Federal Trade Commission has promulgated rules imple-
menting this mandate. Prohibitions on Market Manipulation, 74 Fed. Reg. 40,686, 40,689–
90 (FTC Aug. 12, 2009) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 317). 
228 Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-234, 122 Stat. 923 (to 
be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 8701). 
229 In fact, the CFTC had waived regulation of ICE trading through a series of no-
action letters, based on the notion that United Kingdom rules already regulated that mar-
ket. As a result, ICE began trading futures in West Texas intermediate crude, a so-called 
“look-alike” contract that was identical to the WTI contracts on NYMEX. Under pressure, 
however, the CFTC closed this so-called “London loophole” in 2008. See Press Release, 
CFTC, CFTC Conditions Foreign Access on Adoption of Position Limits on London Crude 
Oil Contract ( June 17, 2008), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr5511-08. 
230 Pub. L. No. 111-203, tit. VII, 124 Stat. 1376, 1641 (to be codified in scattered sec-
tions of 7, 15 U.S.C.). 
231 The CFTC imposes position limits—limits on the size (volume) of a position (long 
or short) that a trader can take. See infra note 235. 
232 In futures trading, “margins” are the good faith deposits required by an exchange 
to mitigate credit risk and facilitate the operation of the marketplace. 
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are underway.233 The CFTC is proposing that swap dealers and major 
swap participants be required to register with the CFTC and be subject 
to the margin requirements, reporting, recordkeeping, and business 
conduct requirements established under section 4 of the CEA.234 The 
CFTC has also proposed position limits235 for traders, though swaps for 
bona-fide hedging are exempt from position limits.236 In addition, the 
CFTC has proposed margin requirements for: (1) uncleared swaps en-
tered into by major swap participants and swap dealers who are not 
banks when there is no prudential regulator imposing capital require-
ments and variation and (2) for swaps that are not cleared by clearing 
                                                                                                                      
233 To view the CFTC’s Dodd-Frank website, see Dodd-Frank Act, CFTC, http://www. 
cftc.gov/LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct/index.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2011). 
234 Registration of Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 75 Fed. Reg. 71,379, 
71,380 (proposed Nov. 23, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 3, 23, & 170). In its pro-
posed definition of a “swap dealer,” the CFTC has taken a functional approach—one that 
focuses on the dealer’s relationship with counterparties. Further Definition of “Swap Deal-
er,” “Security-Based Swap Dealer,” “Major Swap Participant,” “Major Security-Based Swap 
Participant,” and “Eligible Contract Participant,” 75 Fed. Reg. 80,174, 80,177 (proposed 
Dec. 21, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1 & 240). Similarly, the proposed definition 
of “major swap participant” focuses on the risk associated with the entity’s swap and on 
market impacts. Id. at 80,185–86. 
235 Position Limits for Derivatives, 76 Fed. Reg. 4752, 4757, 4762 (proposed Jan. 26, 
2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 1, 150, 151). The CFTC will set “visibility reporting 
levels” for referenced energy contracts when it believes about twenty owners over a year 
would exceed these levels. Id. at 4761. Visibility levels for NYMEX Light Sweet Crude Oil 
and Henry Hub National Gas would be set at a lower level as the CFTC believes these are 
important to the national economy. Id. The CFTC’s rules also require a trader who con-
trols or holds positions in referenced contracts that exceed proposed visibility levels to 
submit more information concerning their derivatives and cash market activities in order 
to monitor positions for energy contracts for the market’s largest traders. Id. at 4761. 
236 Id. at 4771. The CFTC’s proposed rules define a bona fide hedging transaction as 
applied to all referenced contracts as one that: 
(i) Represents a substitute for transactions made or to be made or positions 
taken or to be taken at a later time in a physical marketing channel; (ii) Is 
economically appropriate to the reduction of risks in the conduct and man-
agement of a commercial enterprise; and (iii) Arises from the potential 
change in the value of–-(A) Assets that a person owns, produces, manufac-
tures, processes, or merchandises or anticipates owning, producing, manufac-
turing, processing or merchandising; (B) Liabilities that a person owns or an-
ticipates incurring; or (C) Services that a person provides or purchases, or 
anticipates providing or purchasing; or (iv) Reduces risks attendant to a posi-
tion resulting from a swap that . . . [w]as executed opposite a counterparty for 
which the transaction would qualify as a bona fide hedging transaction [in (i), 
(ii), or (iii) or meets the requirements of (i), (ii), or (iii)] . . . . 
Id. 
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organizations.237 Perhaps most importantly for energy markets, since 
the enactment of Dodd-Frank, the CFTC has also proposed additional 
rules on market manipulation that would subject end-users to disclosure 
requirements. Moreover, the CFTC has clarified that “reckless conduct” 
could constitute manipulation, and has explicitly prohibited “attempted 
price manipulation.”238 
III. Competition and Consumer Protection Under the New 
Regulatory Regime 
 The rise of more active and competitive energy markets begat 
more active and competitive energy derivatives markets. Because these 
two types of energy markets are interrelated, and because derivatives 
markets share some of the characteristics of securities markets, it is 
perhaps understandable that regulators would turn to securities regula-
tion in their efforts to manage modern energy markets. Energy markets 
are still evolving, and the move to a securities regulation model is the 
latest in a series of steps aimed at fine-tuning those markets. It remains 
to be seen, however, whether this approach will be effective. Its logic is 
clear: free and competitive energy markets cannot realize the benefits 
of competition if they are being manipulated at the expense of con-
sumers. Hence, the new regulatory model tries to combat manipulation 
and market power by focusing regulators’ attention on fraud and de-
ception in energy markets. In so doing, however, the new regulatory 
model may be diverting attention away from other ways in which mar-
ket participants might acquire and use market power without using 
fraud or deceit. For example, market participants might corner or 
squeeze markets at the expense of consumers; or pivotal suppliers (par-
ticularly of electricity) might acquire and maintain market power, and 
subsequently capture scarcity rents over a sustained period of time. For 
these reasons, the new regime may not afford consumers as much pro-
                                                                                                                      
237 Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Par-
ticipants, 76 Fed. Reg. 23,732, 23,733 (proposed Apr. 28, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pt. 23). 
238 Prohibiting of Market Manipulation, 75 Fed. Reg. 67,657, 67,659, 67,661 (proposed 
Nov. 3, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 180). To satisfy the “recklessness” require-
ment, there must be a specific intent to defraud or manipulate, or to recklessly do so. Id. at 
67,659. Negligence is not enough to fulfill this requirement. Id. Many commentators have 
raised concerns about whether or not recklessness is an appropriate standard. See id. To 
satisfy the “attempted” manipulation standard, the violator must intend to manipulate and 
commit “an overt act in furtherance of that intent.” Id. at 67,660. 
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tection from the exercise of market power as did the traditional anti-
trust and public utility regimes. 
A. Corners, Manipulation, and Deceit 
1. Manipulation Under the Securities Laws 
 In patterning the energy market anti-manipulation rules after sec-
tion 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“1934 Act”) and Rule 
10b-5, Congress followed well developed precedent.239 Section 10(b) 
punishes any “manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance” in viola-
tion of SEC rules such as 10b-5. This Rule reads: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by 
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate com-
merce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securi-
ties exchange, 
 (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
 (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to 
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading, or 
 (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business 
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any 
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any secu-
rity.240 
Over the years, the vast majority of Rule 10b-5 cases have involved false 
statements or omissions of material fact—that is, violations of subsec-
tion (b) of Rule 10b-5.241 This led to a focus on fraud and deception in 
enforcement of that section, which courts then carried over to subsec-
tions (a) and (c) of Rule 10b-5, including in cases that first and fore-
most involved manipulation. 
                                                                                                                      
239 Congress borrowed the section 10(b) language from section 17(a) of the 1933 Se-
curities Act. See Thomas Lee Hazen, The Law of Securities Regulation 442 (6th ed. 
2009) (“Promulgated in 1942, Rule 10b-5 was patterned directly upon section 17(a) of the 
1933 Act.”). The Securities Act borrowed it from New York’s Martin Act. Aaron v. SEC, 446 
U.S. 680, 700 n.18 (1980). The Martin Act, in turn, borrowed the language from a federal 
mail-fraud statute enacted in 1872. Beth Israel Med. Ctr. v. Smith, 576 F. Supp. 1061, 1066 
(S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
240 Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011). 
241 See Robert A. Prentice, Scheme Liability: Does It Have a Future After Stoneridge?, 2009 
Wisc. L. Rev. 351, 360. 
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 In the 1976 case of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,242 the Supreme 
Court wrote that manipulation “is and was virtually a term of art when 
used in connection with securities markets. It connotes intentional or 
willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling 
or artificially affecting the price of securities.”243 Thereafter, through a 
series of decisions, the Court repeatedly held that, in order to be ma-
nipulative, statements and conduct must be deceptive.244 Lower courts 
have followed this precedent in manipulation cases, with the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit observing that “[t]he gravamen of 
manipulation is deception of investors into believing that prices at 
which they purchase and sell securities are determined by the natural 
interplay of supply and demand, not rigged by manipulators.”245 The 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has agreed, holding that 
“manipulation is a kind of fraud; deceit remains essential.”246 
 Because of this tie between manipulation and deception, virtually 
all Rule 10b-5 manipulation cases have involved either false statements 
or what might be termed “false trading” (or both). The classic securities 
manipulation scheme involving false statements is the “pump-and-
dump” scheme in which manipulators purchase shares of a company 
and then use false advertising or fake press releases to stimulate interest 
in its shares. These false representations pump up the market price; the 
manipulators then dump their shares at a quick profit.247 For example, 
in United States v. Moldofsky, a 2002 case decided by the U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of New York, the defendant bought 
shares of a company and then anonymously posted fake messages re-
garding the company on an investors’ internet message board in an 
attempt to raise its stock price so that he could dump his shares for a 
quick profit.248 Alternatively, a brokerage firm might quote excessive 
                                                                                                                      
 
242 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976). 
243 Id. (citing Webster’s International Dictionary (2d ed. 1934)). 
244 See, e.g., Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1985); Chiarella v. United 
States, 445 U.S. 222, 234–35 (1980); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 
(1977). 
245 Gurary v. Winehouse, 190 F.3d 37, 45 (2d Cir. 1999). 
246 Foss v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 394 F.3d 540, 542 (7th Cir 2005). 
247 See, e.g., United States v. Ware, 577 F.3d 442, 445 (2d Cir. 2009) (misleading press 
releases inflate share price); SEC v. Gordon, No. 09-CV-0061-CVE-FHM, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 66427, at *4 (N.D. Okla. July 28, 2009) (misrepresentations distributed to market in 
mass spam e-mails); SEC v. Sierra Brokerage Servs., 608 F. Supp. 2d 923, 935 (S.D. Ohio 
2009) (internet touting campaign, posting numerous messages on online investor message 
boards). 
248 No. 00 CR. 388, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19853, at *1–5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2002); cf. 
Varljen v. H.J. Meyers, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 6742, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10493, at *3–6 
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prices for a company’s stock in order to make it appear that there was 
demand where none existed.249 
 A manipulation claim based solely on misrepresentations or omis-
sions would be a violation of subsection (b) of Rule 10b-5, but, as at 
least one court has held, not of subsections (a) and (c) because these 
sections require actions.250 Those actions may involve false trades that 
give a misleading impression of market activity. The Supreme Court 
held in its 1977 decision in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green251 that ma-
nipulation “refers generally to practices, such as wash sales, matched 
orders, or rigged prices, that are intended to mislead investors by artifi-
cially affecting market activity.”252 Examples of “false trades” include: 
(1) “bearding,” whereby traders disguise their true interest in a security 
or create the appearance of heightened interest in the marketplace by 
using third parties to make trades on their behalf while hiding their 
involvement;253 (2) wash sales of the kind made during the California 
energy crisis;254 (3) “matched trades,” whereby manipulators either 
trade shares amongst themselves, sometimes at escalating prices255 or 
instigate two other parties to act as contra-parties to a trade to create 
the false appearance that there is real interest in the subject stock;256 
(4) rigged prices; and (5) “painting the tape” or “painting the close,” 
which involves intensive trading near the end of the trading day for the 
purpose of setting the stock’s ending price (and therefore its beginning 
price the next trading day) at an artificial level.257 These maneuvers are 
                                                                                                                      
(S.D.N.Y. July 14, 1998) (finding manipulation where defendants made repeated false 
statements to customers, disseminated false information into the market regarding the 
value of stock, induced inexperienced brokers to sell large volumes of the subject com-
pany’s shares to reluctant buyers, and refused to execute customers’ sell orders); SEC v. 
Lorin, 877 F. Supp. 192, 196–97 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 76 F.3d 458 (2d 
Cir. 1996) (“The law . . . provides for an inference of market manipulation through domi-
nation and control where a broker consistently quotes bids for stock that exceed the 
amounts created by the demand for that stock on the open market.”). 
249 Varljen, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10493, at *2–3. 
250 Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 177–78 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Schnell 
v. Conseco, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 438, 447–48 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)). 
251 430 U.S. at 476. 
252 Id. (citing Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 199). 
253 See, e.g., SEC v. Sayegh, 906 F. Supp. 939, 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
254 In securities law, wash trades typically involve traders who buy and sell a similar 
number of a company’s shares at about the same time, producing no real change in own-
ership but giving the impression of interest in the company’s shares. See, e.g., SEC v. U.S. 
Envtl., Inc., 155 F.3d 107, 109 (2d Cir. 1998). 
255 See, e.g., Sierra Brokerage Servs., 608 F. Supp. 2d at 960–61. 
256 See, e.g., United States v. Georgiou, 744 F. Supp. 2d 613, 628 (E.D. Pa. 2010). 
257 Also known as “marking the tape.” 
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so transparently fraudulent that they are “patently manipulative, serv-
ing no purpose other than to transmit false information to the market 
and artificially affect prices.”258 In the context of a Rule 10b-5(b) claim, 
many courts hold that a defendant’s failure to disclose that market 
prices are being manipulated constitutes a material omission that vio-
lates section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.259 These false trading practices are 
so emblematic of fraudulent manipulation that the “defendant’s ma-
nipulative intent can be inferred from the conduct itself.”260 
 Significantly, because in most courts’ estimation fraud and deceit 
are a necessary part of any Rule 10b-5 violation, open market activity 
that does not involve false statements or false trading is generally not 
treated as manipulative. In GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt,261 the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in 2001 explicitly accepted 
the proposition that normal trading cannot be manipulative without 
more, observing that it might be difficult to “distinguish between le-
gitimate trading strategies intended to anticipate and respond to pre-
vailing market forces and those designed to manipulate prices and de-
ceive purchasers and sellers.”262 Therefore, the court held that not only 
must there be evidence of a subjective intent to manipulate—the ele-
ment that many courts consider to be the sine qua non of manipula-
tion263—there must also be evidence that the alleged manipulator “en-
gaged in . . . deceptive or manipulative conduct by injecting . . . 
inaccurate information into the marketplace or creating a false impres-
sion of supply and demand for the stock.”264 Where false trading oc-
curs, it clearly meets this requirement. The court in GFL Advantage 
held, however, that short sales alone—even in substantial quantities— 
could not meet this requirement and that “some other deceptive prac-
tice” was required.265 As examples of “other deceptive practices,” the 
court listed activities such as unauthorized placement and parking of 
stock, secret sales without disclosing the real party in interest, encour-
aging others to sell short by guaranteeing profits, fraudulently low ap-
praisals, painting the tape, and matched sales.266 
                                                                                                                      
258 SEC v. Masri, 523 F. Supp. 2d 361, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
259 Sierra Brokerage, 608 F. Supp. 2d at 961. 
260 Masri, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 367. 
261 272 F.3d 189, 205 (3d Cir. 2001). 
262 Id. 
263 Varljen, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10493, at *16. 
264 GFL Advantage, 272 F.3d at 207. 
265 Id. at 207–08, 211; see also Cohen v. Stevanovich, 722 F. Supp. 2d 416, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010) (holding that short selling, by itself, is not manipulative, even in large volumes). 
266 GFL Advantage, 272 F.3d at 207–08. 
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 In open-market manipulation cases, then, the most common formu-
lation of the relevant factors includes: (1) “‘profit or personal gain to the 
alleged manipulator’”; (2) “deceptive intent”; (3) “market domination”; 
and (4) “economic reasonableness of the alleged manipulation.”267 
2. The Uncertain Case for Open Market Manipulation in Securities 
Cases 
 Nondeceptive manipulation in the form of corners or other bla-
tant exercises of market power is less frequent in securities markets 
than in energy and commodities markets;268 in securities markets, mar-
ket power almost never appears except in the presence of false state-
ments and/or false trading. Therefore, the issue of whether fraud or 
deception is an essential element of manipulation is less important in 
securities law than in energy and commodities law. Perhaps that is why 
the issue is unsettled. One can build a logical case for finding securities 
manipulation even in the absence of false statements or false trades, 
but the case must overcome some existing precedents. Unless such a 
case can be made, however, agencies and courts applying section 10(b) 
precedent to alleged manipulation of energy markets will be less likely 
to penalize open market manipulation not involving deception, such as 
a naked exercise of market power. Although the vast majority of case 
law indicates that deception is a necessary element of Rule 10b-5 ma-
nipulation, in this section we make the case that: (1) Rule 10b-5 should 
be construed to protect against nondeceptive manipulation and (2) 
despite courts’ claims to the contrary, Rule 10b-5 often has been con-
strued that way. 
 First, the language of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act distinguishes 
deception from manipulation (“manipulative or deceptive devices”). 
Therefore, it seems obvious that a device may be (1) deceptive without 
being manipulative, (2) deceptive and manipulative, or (3) manipulat-
ive without being deceptive. Although the Supreme Court often states 
that matters of statutory interpretation start with the language of the 
statute,269 in divining the meaning of the term “manipulation,” the 
Court has paid precious little attention to the wording of section 10(b). 
By requiring that acts be deceptive in order to be manipulative, the 
                                                                                                                      
267 In re Coll. Bound Consol. Litig., Nos. 93 Civ. 2348, 94 Civ. 3033, 1995 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 10684, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1995) (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. 
Mulheren, 938 F.2d 364, 370–72 (2d Cir. 1991)). 
268 Steve Thel, Regulation of Manipulation Under Section 10(b): Security Prices and the Text of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 1988 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 359, 433. 
269 United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989). 
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Court has functionally collapsed the two terms.270 The Supreme Court 
relied upon little more than a simple dictionary definition when it first 
set the precedent that manipulation requires deception.271 Neverthe-
less, examining in detail the legislative history of the 1934 Act, as well as 
its purposes and provisions, one commenter has built a very strong case 
for a broader view.272 The primary reason the 1934 Securities Exchange 
Act was enacted was to protect the integrity of stock market prices.273 
An exhaustive examination led to the conclusion that “[t]he SEC’s au-
thority to regulate the use of manipulative devices and contrivances 
under § 10(b) extends to all practices that contribute to disorder in the 
market or that give voice to speculative sentiment there.”274 Although 
the Supreme Court has repeatedly focused on disclosure when discuss-
ing the 1934 Act, many, many provisions of the 1934 Act “reflect a con-
cern with the effect that trading itself has on [stock] price.”275 
 There are a number of judicial opinions containing language sup-
porting the idea that manipulation occurs when the price of a security 
is divorced from the forces of supply and demand, whether or not there 
is deception. Most of those opinions, however, involve defendants 
whose behavior was intended to create a false impression of the value of 
stock. Consider a form of open market manipulation called “domina-
tion and control.” In SEC v. Resch-Cassin & Co., a 1973 case from the 
Southern District of New York,276 an underwriter was selling an “all or 
none” offering for a company named “Africa.” The offering price was 
ten dollars per share and Resch-Cassin told several potential investors 
that the aftermarket price would be around twenty-two dollars per 
share. In fact, the offering was not going well and the firm faced the 
likelihood that it would have to cancel the offering and give back the 
money being held in escrow. There was little demand for Africa’s 
shares, so to maintain its stock price or even to raise it, the firm enlisted 
confederates to buy Africa stock and sell it among themselves at in-
                                                                                                                      
270 Thel, supra note 268, at 385 (noting that the Court’s decisions have “deprived the 
word manipulative of any independent significance”). 
271 See Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 199 (quoting Webster’s International Dictionary (2d 
ed. 1934)). 
272 See Thel, supra note 268, at 374–82. 
273 Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 195 (“The 1934 Act was intended principally to protect inves-
tors against manipulation of stock prices through regulation of transactions upon securi-
ties exchanges and in over-the-counter markets, and to impose regular reporting require-
ments on companies whose stock is listed on national securities exchanges.”). 
274 Thel, supra note 268, at 438. 
275 Id. at 376. 
276 362 F. Supp. 964, 966–75 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). 
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creasingly higher prices. In trying to determine whether “manipula-
tion” had occurred, the court looked for four factors, none of which 
was deception. The four factors were: (1) price leadership by the ma-
nipulator, (2) dominion and control of the market for the security, (3) 
reduction in the floating supply of the security, and (4) the collapse of 
the market for the security when the manipulator ceases activity.277 The 
court found “[a]ll the classic elements of an over-the-counter manipu-
lation”278 to be present279 and ruled for the SEC, finding that defen-
dants’ actions violated Rule 10b-5.280 The defendants argued that they 
were engaged in “normal trading” rather than false trading in the form 
of wash sales and matched trades, but the court concluded that their 
trades “were designed to induce others to purchase the security,” and 
hence were manipulative.281 
 There are other cases that reject the language in the GFL Advantage 
opinion that normal trading cannot be manipulative without more. For 
example, in a 2002 case from the Southern District of New York, Nano-
pierce Technologies, Inc. v. Southridge Capital Management LLC,282 Nano-
pierce Technologies (“NPCT”) sought financing from Southridge in 
exchange for shares of NPCT. The agreement contained so-called “reset 
rights” that would give Southridge more shares of NPCT if NPCT’s share 
price declined. Southridge promised not to abuse this reset right by do-
ing something scurrilous like short selling NPCT shares to drive down 
the stock price. NPCT alleged, however, that Southridge did exactly that 
through straw parties and confederates. As soon as the deal was closed, 
NPCT’s agents began selling NPCT shares almost every day, accounting 
for over half the volume of NPCT share trading and driving the stock 
price steadily down from $2.63 to $0.32, even though no adverse infor-
mation about NPCT’s prospects entered the marketplace.283 Relying on 
                                                                                                                      
277 Id. at 976; see also SEC v. Martino, 255 F. Supp. 2d 268, 286–87 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(adopting these four elements for a domination and control manipulation claim). 
278 Resch-Cassin, 362 F. Supp. at 978. 
279 The court found “dominion and control” by Nagler-Weissman (the brokerage firm) 
from the fact that it purchased or caused to be purchased two-thirds of the total shares 
bought even though there were eighteen other broker-dealers in the pink sheets at the 
time. Id. at 977. 
280 The practices outlined also violated section 9(a)(2) of the 1934 Act, which was 
“‘aimed at preventing an individual from dominating the market in a stock for the purpose 
of conducting a one-sided market at an artificial level for its own benefit and to the detri-
ment of the investing public.’” Id. at 978 (quoting Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake 
Co., 419 F.2d 787, 794 (2d Cir. 1969)). 
281 Id. at 977. 
282 No. 02 Civ. 0767, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24049, at *4–7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2002). 
283 Id. 
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GFL Advantage, the defendants argued that the simple act of selling 
NPCT shares could not be manipulative when NPCT had not alleged 
that defendants had injected false information into the market.284 The 
court admitted that the law was uncertain on this issue,285 but the court 
sided with plaintiffs, citing a 1995 decision from the Southern District of 
New York, In re College Bound Consolidated Litigation,286 to find deceptive 
intent: 
[T]his Court is drawn ineluctably to the opinion that NPCT 
has adequately alleged that Defendants have “engaged in de-
ceptive or manipulative conduct by . . . creating a false impression 
of supply and demand for the security.” Although NPCT does not 
currently allege significant short sales, it does allege (1) subjec-
tive intent to depress the value of NPCT stock, based on a fi-
nancing agreement that provides a motive for manipulation; 
(2) timing of sales beginning the first trading day after closing 
and continuing until liquidation; (3) dominant or near-
dominant trading volume throughout a six month period; (4) 
significant amounts of trading conducted through a non-
market maker; and (5) an extensive pattern of similar invest-
ments and subsequent stock price drops in other compa-
nies.287 
In these cases, it is trading in sufficient volume to move price that com-
prises the manipulation.288 
                                                                                                                      
 
284 Id. at *18–19. 
285 Id. at *21. Indeed, this question had been left open by the Second Circuit. See Mul-
heren, 938 F.2d at 368. 
286 1995 U.S. LEXIS 10684, at *15. 
287 Nanopierce Techs., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24049, at *30 (emphasis added); see also 
Markowski v. SEC, 274 F.3d 525, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (finding manipulation in trades that 
maintained high prices and absorbed all unwanted securities into inventory in order to 
prevent sales from driving the stock price down). 
288 See United States v. Regan, 937 F.2d 823, 829 (2d Cir. 1991) (concluding that an 
underwriter manipulated the market by arranging for a trader to sell 40,000 shares short 
without disclosing that the underwriter was the moving party behind the transaction). The 
importance of failure to disclose can be seen by comparing two recent cases arising from 
the subprime mess. In In re Merrill Lynch Auction Rate Sec. Litig. the plaintiffs alleged that 
Merrill Lynch had manipulated the auction rate security market to create an appearance 
of a functioning market when, in reality, it participated as an underwriter, an auction deal-
er, and a bidder in its own account, and had prevented more than 5800 auctions from 
failing by placing bids for its own account. 704 F. Supp. 2d 378, 383–84 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
The court found no deception (and therefore no manipulation) because Merrill had dis-
closed that it played all three roles and might intervene in auctions. Id. at 390–93. On the 
other hand, in a similar factual situation, a different court found that Deutsche Bank had 
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 Alternatively, the defendant may acquire market power by control-
ling a large majority of the available stock. In a 1986 case decided by 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Pagel, Inc. v. SEC,289 a 
broker-dealer that underwrote a public offering of Film-Tec Corpora-
tion arranged the offering so that it and its customers controlled more 
than ninety percent of Film-Tec’s stock.290 Over the course of the next 
several months, when it suited Pagel’s purposes, Film-Tec’s stock price 
rose, even though there was no economic justification for it. When the 
principal of Pagel, Inc. needed a tax loss, Pagel arranged for it to hap-
pen, utilizing nothing more than its domination of the market for Film-
Tec stock.291 The Eighth Circuit affirmed an SEC finding of manipula-
tion. Although the key to the scheme was an exercise of market power, 
the Court managed to find deceit: 
When individuals occupying a dominant position engage in a 
scheme to distort the price of a security for their own benefit, 
they violate the securities laws by perpetrating a fraud on all 
public investors. In addition, their failure to disclose that 
market prices are being manipulated not only constitutes an 
element of a scheme to defraud, but is also a material omis-
sion of fact in the offer and sale of securities.292 
If failure to disclose manipulation automatically constitutes a deceptive 
omission, then there will be precious few securities manipulation cases 
that do not involve deception. Twenty years ago, it was observed that 
“[p]erhaps the word deceptive is now broad enough to encompass any 
interference with the market.”293 If all courts follow this practice (and 
clearly many do) they have invented a practical work-around for the 
defective Supreme Court rulings that functionally read nondeceptive 
manipulation out of section 10(b). 
 The cases discussed thus far involved false representations, false 
trades, or transactions featuring domination and control that—in some 
                                                                                                                      
not adequately disclosed that the forces of supply and demand were not fully at play be-
cause it had disclosed that it might intervene in the market when, in fact, it intervened in 
every single auction that it held. La. Pac. Corp. v. Money Mkt. 1 Inst. Inv. Dealer, No. C 09-
03529 JSW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32414, at *19–21 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2011). 
289 803 F.2d 942, 948 (8th Cir. 1986). 
290 Id. at 943. 
291 Id. at 944. 
292 Id. at 946 (quoting In re Pagel, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 22,280, [1985–1986 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶¶ 83,909, 87,752 (Aug. 1, 1985)). 
293 Thel, supra note 268, at 437. 
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fashion—sent false signals to the markets.294 Most of the courts stressed 
that defendants’ acts made it appear that the market was fair, rather 
than being artificially contrived.295 But what about open attempts to 
corner markets, attempts which create no misimpression whatsoever 
about the fairness of those markets? Does that behavior constitute ma-
nipulation? The case law seems a bit contradictory on this point. Both 
United States v. Mulheren,296 a 1991 case decided by the Second Circuit, 
and College Bound297 indicated that conspicuous purchases on the open 
market could not be manipulative because they would not be decep-
tive.298 Nevertheless, although the courts said otherwise, some of the 
language in the Mulheren and College Bound opinions seems to imply 
that “domination and control” manipulation could be established 
based on misuse of a long-time, truly dominant market position even in 
the absence of deception. Is it possible that manipulative intent alone can 
make illicit what would otherwise be legal open-market transactions? 
 Some lower courts appear to have rejected this notion;299 others 
appear open to it.300 The issue was discussed in some detail in a 2007 
decision from the Southern District of New York, SEC v. Masri,301 in 
which the court faced an alleged manipulative scheme involving paint-
                                                                                                                      
294 See, e.g., Crane, 419 F.2d at 795 (finding potential manipulation where a company al-
legedly sought to raise a tender offer target’s price by buying a large volume of shares on 
the open market while secretly selling them at a loss). 
295 See, e.g., SEC v. Rega, No. 73 Civ. 2944, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11581, at *35–36 
(S.D.N.Y. July 3, 1975) (dealing with a domination and control manipulation case wherein 
defendant controlled approximately ninety percent of the issuer’s stock). As one court 
noted, “‘while misrepresentations affect investor beliefs by directly injecting false informa-
tion into the marketplace, market manipulation affects beliefs indirectly by creating cir-
cumstantial evidence that positive information has entered the market.’” Merrill Lynch, 704 
F. Supp. 2d at 390 (quoting Catton v. Def. Tech. Sys., Inc., No. 05 Civ. 6954, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 205, at *27 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2006)). 
296 938 F.2d at 370–71. 
297 1995 U.S. LEXIS 10684, at *16–17. 
298 The College Bound opinion explained, 
In Mulheren, the Court determined that “none of the traditional badges of ma-
nipulation” were present, in significant part, because Mulheren “conspicuously 
purchased the shares . . . in the open market.” The crucial element of decep-
tion therefore was missing. Here as well, plaintiffs have presented no facts which 
suggest that the open-market purchase itself, through Prudential-Bache Securi-
ties, Inc., was deceptive. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
299 See, e.g., In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 281, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003). 
300 See, e.g., Nanopierce Tech., Inc. v. Southridge Capital Mgmt., No. 02 Civ. 0767, 2003 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21854, at *23–27 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2003). 
301 523 F. Supp. 2d at 369–70 (referring to the practice as “marking the close”). 
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ing the close.302 In that case, the court rejected as “go[ing] too far” the 
SEC’s argument that end-of-day transactions by themselves are action-
able as manipulative.303 On the other hand, the court also refused “to 
adopt defendants’ proposed per se rule that open-market activity can-
not be considered manipulative based solely on manipulative intent, 
that is, without additional deceptive or fraudulent conduct.”304 GFL Ad-
vantage had created that rule out of whole cloth, the Masri court con-
cluded.305 The court believed that the intentional distortion of prices 
was clearly violative of 10b-5, even without the injection of inaccurate 
information into the market or the creation of a false impression of 
market activity.306 The court said: 
[I]f an investor conducts an open-market transaction with the 
intent of artificially affecting the price of the security, and not 
for any legitimate economic reason, it can constitute market 
manipulation. Indeed, “the only definition [of market ma-
nipulation] that makes any sense is subjective—it focuses en-
tirely on the intent of the trader.” Allegations of other decep-
tive conduct or features of the transaction are only required 
to the extent that they render plausible allegations of manipu-
lative intent.307 
 Cornering is rare in securities markets, but not unheard of.308 In 
1988, a brokerage firm and its customers held approximately 115 per-
cent of the public float (all of the available shares as well as stock that 
had been sold short) of Chase Medical. The brokerage firm attempted 
a “short squeeze” by calling in the stock loans of short sellers. Had it 
worked, the shorts would have been forced to buy the stock controlled 
                                                                                                                      
302 See SEC v. Schiffer, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6339, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 1998); see 
also Thomas C. Kocherhans, Exchange Act Release No. 36556, 60 SEC Docket 2210, 2212 
(Dec. 6, 1995) (defining the practice as “attempting to influence the closing price of a 
stock by executing purchase or sale orders at or near the close of the market”). 
303 Masri, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 370. 
304 Id. at 371. 
305 Id. at 371–72. 
306 Id. at 372. Although the GFL Advantage court might not accept the rationale, the 
Masri court did observe that “it may be argued that an open-market transaction made with 
manipulative intent in fact injects inaccurate information into the marketplace.” Id. at 372 
n.17. 
307 Id. at 372 (quoting Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, Should the Law Prohibit “Ma-
nipulation” in Financial Markets?, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 503, 510 (1991)). 
308 See Liz Moyer, Cornering the Bond Market?, Forbes.com (Sept. 28, 2006, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/2006/09/27/treasury-bond-markets-corner-biz_cx_lm_0928treasury. 
html (noting a Department of Treasury investigation into manipulation in the bond market, 
and citing earlier examples). 
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by the brokerage firm at inflated prices. Unfortunately for the firm, 
trading in Chase Medical was halted. Later, the SEC took action against 
several of the participants, and many were punished despite the fact 
that it was market power—not deception—that was the key to the 
scheme.309 
 Certainly most manipulative conduct is deceitful, but that is not 
always the case. Consider the Mulheren facts. Famed arbitrageur and 
criminal Ivan Boesky had acquired 3.4 million shares of Gulf & West-
ern, which he hoped to use as the basis for a leveraged buyout. When 
his takeover efforts were rejected, he offered to sell his shares back to 
the company at 45 dollars per share. Marvin Davis, chairman of the 
board, showed some interest in acquiring the shares but refused to pay 
45 dollars, which was above market price. Boesky arranged for a broker, 
Mulheren, to engage in a series of staged purchases, which drove the 
price up to 45 dollars per share, at which point Boesky sold his 
shares.310 This little maneuver made Boesky 850,000 dollars in just six 
minutes.311 Assume instead, however, that the trading had been done 
by Boesky himself. What if, just before the close of trading, when shares 
were trading at 44 and 3/4 dollars, he publicly announced that he was 
willing to pay a premium for shares and offers 45 dollars, raising the 
price to that level just as the market closes? Assume next that Boesky 
held a second press conference and announced that he bid 45 dollars 
for purposes of raising the market price to 45 dollars so that Davis 
would be bound to repurchase all his shares at that amount. If Boesky 
then called Davis and demanded that Gulf & Western buy his 3.4 mil-
lion shares at 45 dollars, would not Davis refuse on grounds that the 
price was the result of manipulation? Would any court fail to find ma-
nipulation in violation of Rule 10b-5 on these facts, even though Boesky 
had been open and transparent about his “normal trade”? We doubt it. 
                                                                                                                      
309 See, e.g., Sayegh, 906 F. Supp. at 946; Vincent Militano, Exchange Act Release No. 
36,312, 1995 SEC LEXIS 2579, at *2 (Sept. 29, 1995) (order instituting public administra-
tive proceedings, making findings, and imposing remedial sanctions) (noting that Militano 
had pled guilty to securities fraud in connection with the manipulation of Chase Medical 
stock). 
310 See Steve Thel, $850,000 in Six Minutes—The Mechanics of Securities Manipulation, 79 
Cornell L. Rev. 219, 252–53 (1994). 
311 This profit, admittedly, came at a cost of $64,406; all told, this leaves a very nice re-
turn on investment. Incredibly, the Second Circuit held not only that this was not manipu-
lation, but also that no reasonable jury could have found that it was, overturning the jury 
verdict. See Mulheren, 938 F.2d at 372. 
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3. Implications for Energy Markets 
 It remains to be seen how the regulation of energy markets will be 
affected by prior case law under section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act. Most recent prosecutions of unfair trade practices in en-
ergy markets have focused on deceptive behavior.312 One exception is 
the CFTC’s prosecution of BP in 2007, which was based on BP’s at-
tempts to corner the propane market. In settling the case, BP acknowl-
edged facts that amounted to an open corner—that is, an attempt to 
influence prices, purely by engaging in transactions of sufficient vol-
ume to move the market price.313 The CFTC brought that case under 
the Commodities Exchange Act, which explicitly prohibits corners. 
Physical markets in natural gas (as distinguished from propane) and 
electricity are traditionally governed by FERC, subject to the “manipu-
lative or deceptive device” language of the Federal Power Act (FPA) 
and Natural Gas Act (NGA). That language does not explicitly prohibit 
corners and squeezes. FERC’s only major manipulation prosecution 
under the new regime to date was its collaborative enforcement effort 
(along with the CFTC) of Amaranth, a case that involved deception.314 
 One economist argues that the modern regulatory regime is ill-
equipped to prosecute market power manipulation in energy mar-
kets.315 Although the Commodities Exchange Act proscribes market 
power manipulation (corners), there is a contention that it typically (1) 
ignores market power manipulations that exploit scarcity conditions 
created in part by the trader’s own positions and (2) invites courts to 
look for the presence of deception or fraud in such cases ( just as have 
courts in securities cases). For example, whereas BP settled charges of 
cornering the propane market, the case against individual BP employ-
ees who participated in the corner was dismissed, in part because the 
government tried to convince the judge that the corner was “a type of 
fraud or deceit.”316 There is even more criticism of the new securities 
regulation approach found in the FPA and NGA, observing that be-
cause it does not explicitly cover corners, the framework is “completely 
                                                                                                                      
312 See Amaranth, supra note 173; Market Manipulation Case, supra note 178. 
313 See CFTC v. BP Prods. N. Am., Inc., Consent Order for Permanent Injunction and 
Other Relief, Docket No. 06-C-3503 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 2007), available at http://www.cftc. 
gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfbporder 
102507.pdf. 
314 See Amaranth, supra note 173. 
315 Craig Pirrong, Energy Market Manipulation: Definition, Diagnosis, and Deterrence, 31 
Energy L.J. 1, 1 (2010). 
316 Id. at 13 (citing United States v. Radley, 659 F. Supp. 2d 803, 820 (S.D. Tex. 2009)). 
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misguided and hopelessly ill-suited” to the purpose of regulating mar-
ket power manipulation.317 Others argue that the term “manipulation” 
is sufficiently flexible to cover market power manipulation.318 
 It is easy to see how the securities regulation approach, with its fo-
cus on deceit, is much better suited to securities markets than to energy 
markets. Its focus on deceptive behavior makes sense in securities mar-
kets because the value of the item traded—company shares—is directly 
dependent upon information about those shares. In energy markets, 
traders are fully informed about the characteristics of the thing being 
traded—oil, gas, or electricity. Rather, what matters is its relative scarcity. 
Hence, there is at least a strong theoretical argument that the new fo-
cus on deception misses the mark. More importantly, it seems to offer 
buyers less protection than do traditional public utility rate regulation 
or antitrust principles. 
B. The Problem of Incidental Market Power 
 A new focus on deception raises additional issues because sophisti-
cated traders can squeeze or corner energy markets without deception. 
For example, traders may take a large position—say, in futures—as a 
legitimate hedge, and then capitalize on that position when market 
conditions change by squeezing the market.319 Similarly, sellers of en-
ergy can acquire market power simply by becoming pivotal suppliers 
during times of scarcity. That is what happened during the California 
electricity crisis, when individual wholesale sellers of electricity found 
themselves able to determine the market clearing price during times of 
scarcity.320 Indeed, electricity markets are particularly susceptible to this 
                                                                                                                      
 
317 Id. at 2. In addition, the CFTC may face resource constraints in its efforts to moni-
tor derivatives markets. See Tom Braithwaite, CFTC Seeks to Calm Opponents on Derivatives, 
Fin. Times (London), Feb. 16, 2011, at 5. 
318 This group includes representatives of FERC’s Division of Energy Market Oversight. 
See Shaun D. Ledgerwood, Screens for the Detection of Manipulative Intent Abstract (Dec. 
19, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1728473. One 
author acknowledges that there is a “case for questioning the appropriateness of fraud-
based statutes to prevent ‘market power manipulations.’” Id. at 9. But, to the extent that 
counterparties are unaware of the manipulators’ acquisition of market power, this has 
been seen as a form of deception. See id. at 9–10. 
319 See e.g. Ind. Farm Bureau Coop. Ass’n, [1982–1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. 
Rep. (CCH) ¶¶ 21,796, 27,285 (Dec. 17, 1982). The CFTC decided not to prosecute this as 
manipulation, concluding that the defendant was entitled to “[seek] the best price from 
the existing situation.” Id. 
320 As noted, see supra notes 96–238 and accompanying text, FERC flirted with, but 
abandoned, the notion of classifying sellers who acquire market power in this way (that is, 
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problem because electricity cannot be stored. FERC has the power to 
limit the ability of suppliers to charge monopoly prices when and if the 
agency detects this kind of market power. Yet, because of the imperfect 
fit between competitive energy markets and some of the remaining fea-
tures of the traditional public utility regime, incumbent sellers of en-
ergy (particularly electricity) can nevertheless capture scarcity rents at 
the expense of consumers over extended periods of time.321 
1. FERC’s Approach to the Exercise of Market Power 
 Recall that FERC tries to control the exercise of market power in 
physical markets for natural gas and electricity (and fulfill its obligation 
to ensure that wholesale rates are “just and reasonable”) by revoking a 
seller’s power to charge market-based rates for energy in the future 
and/or “mitigating” that seller’s market power by imposing price caps. 
FERC’s mitigation price caps are typically set at levels FERC believes are 
                                                                                                                      
without engaging in manipulation or deception, but rather due to conditions beyond their 
control) as violators of the agencies’ market behavior rules. 
321 There is objection to our use of the term “incidental market power.” See private corre-
spondence on file with authors. We believe, however, that the term fits the phenomena we 
are describing in this paragraph. We do agree that manipulation may arise outside the two 
primary settings we analyze here involving either deception or an exercise of market power. 
A third type of manipulation can derive from what has been called “[u]neconomic trading: 
[b]ids significantly above or offers significantly below market [value.]” Shaun Ledgerwood, 
Triggers and Targets: The Anatomy of Market Manipulation 2 ( July 22, 2011) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1893225. Such trading can manipulate 
stock or energy prices without the manipulator holding market power and without any direct 
deception (although, as noted above, some courts might find deception from the simple fact 
that the manipulator is failing to disclose the manipulation). The Amaranth case is an exam-
ple of uneconomic trading, and in describing it and others, one author explains: 
The common thread among these cases confirms that this type of trigger 
[uneconomic trading] is especially problematic in energy markets, wherein 
the likelihood of a successful manipulation is enhanced by frequent episodes 
of inelastic demand and supply, heavy reliance on price indices as the price-
making mechanism, and the use of price-making transactions by market par-
ticipants that simultaneously hold large physical and financial price-taking 
positions. Because the execution of trades at a loss requires no market power 
in any traditional sense, loss-based manipulations can be executed by any en-
tity that holds sufficient financial or physical leverage such that the losses it 
intentionally takes on its price-setting trades are more than offset by the re-
sulting gains made in its targeted positions. 
Id. at 4 (citations omitted); see also Shaun Ledgerwood & Paul Carpenter, A Framework for 
Analyzing Market Manipulation 9 (Apr. 16, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1811764. 
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sufficiently high to attract investment in new supply,322 reflecting the 
hope or expectation that new firms will enter the market to bring the 
price down to competitive levels. There is a clear logic to this approach. 
In order for markets to work, prices must be permitted to fluctuate: 
only high prices will invite entry and depress consumer demand (at 
least in theory). This view also seems fairly consistent with modern anti-
trust analysis, which includes the notion that for some industries, scale 
can be associated with increased efficiency,323 as well as the notion that 
the market can often be counted on to discipline monopolies through 
the entry of competitors and/or through innovation that transforms 
the market.324 
 In electricity markets this dynamic can be interrupted by legal bar-
riers to entry (such as insurmountable permitting requirements). One 
might argue, however, that these regulatory barriers represent choices 
made by state and local governments to avoid the social costs associated 
with generating facilities within their communities (such as pollution). 
Therefore, we might infer that these communities choose sustained high 
energy costs as the price of avoiding those unwanted social costs. By 
that logic, FERC’s mitigation policy takes the right approach by setting 
rate caps at levels high enough to invite entry but for those legal barri-
ers. That conclusion, however, rests on a simplistic view of political 
choice. Even if the majority of the community seeks construction of 
new generating capacity, prospective developers may be discouraged 
from developing in areas where opposition from a small subset of the 
community is strong. Local opposition can be expressed in a variety of 
forms, from legislation to litigation to direct protest. Sophisticated “not 
                                                                                                                      
322 FERC’s approach to this issue is explained in its Order No. 719. Wholesale Compe-
tition in Regions with Organized Electric Markets, Order No. 719, 73 Fed. Reg. 64,100, 
64,101–02 (FERC Oct. 17, 2008) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). Commenters had 
argued that the order would leave customers without tools to respond to high prices dur-
ing times of scarcity, but FERC rejected those arguments. 
323 For an example of this view, with a particular focus on transaction costs and the 
“make or buy” question—i.e., whether it is more efficient for the firm to acquire goods in 
arms-length transactions or to integrate vertically or horizontally. See The Nature of the 
Firm: The Origins, Evolution, and Development 3–17 (Oliver E. Williamson & Sidney 
G. Winter eds., 1991); Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 699, 703–24 (1977). For an extension of this analysis in the context of anti-
trust law, see generally John J. Siegfried & Edwin H. Wheeler, Cost Efficiency and Monopoly 
Power: A Survey, 21 Q. Rev. Econ. & Bus. 25 (1981). Judge Richard Posner and others con-
tinue to make the case for the inefficiency of monopoly, arguing that economists some-
times underestimate social costs associated with firms’ expenditures in order to acquire 
monopoly power. See Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law 9–32 (2d ed. 2001). 
324 Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 354–55 (8th ed. 2011) (discuss-
ing new entry); id. at 361–65 (discussing innovation). 
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in my backyard” (NIMBY) groups can block a project even if they rep-
resent a minority viewpoint.325 In such cases, it is difficult to ascribe 
shortages to regulatory barriers or community choice. 
 Putting aside the presence of local opposition or regulatory barri-
ers to entry, construction of new generating capacity is a complicated 
business proposition, one fraught with what investors call “political 
risk.” Virtually every segment of the industry faces the possibility of 
regulatory change that could alter market fundamentals. Government 
provides a bewildering array of subsidies and assistance to virtually 
every fuel source used to generate electricity.326 And, these programs 
come and go quickly,327 which makes it difficult for prospective inves-
tors in new capacity to be sure that their plants will be cost competitive 
compared to those of their current and future competitors. Nor is the 
demand side of the equation much more certain. New programs de-
signed to promote energy efficiency, for example, could reduce de-
mand for electricity by more than twenty percent, if implemented.328 
                                                                                                                      
 
325 There is a large body of literature on NIMBY groups: how they arise, their effec-
tiveness, and potential solutions to NIMBY problems. Economists typically propose com-
pensation of opponents as a solution to the NIMBY problem, and as a way to promote 
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. Compensation, however, is much more tractable in theory than in 
practice, and can raise moral hazard problems as well. Often, it is not possible to compen-
sate NIMBY group members, either because of political barriers or moral hazard (hold-up) 
problems. For a good discussion of this literature and these issues, see generally Vicki 
Been, What’s Fairness Got to Do with It? Environmental Justice and the Siting of Locally Undesir-
able Land Uses, 78 Cornell L. Rev. 1001 (1993). 
326 See Envtl. Law Inst., Estimating U. S. Government Subsidies to Energy 
Sources: 2002–2008, at 3–4 (2009), available at http://www.elistore.org/Data/products/ 
d19_07.pdf. 
327 Examples of this policy fluidity are legion. The renewable energy industry in the 
United States has suffered from a lack of predictability when it comes to subsidies. Erin 
Dewey, Note, Sundown and You Better Take Care: Why Sunset Provisions Harm Renewable Energy 
Industry and Violate Tax Principles, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 1105, 1134–35 (2011). The production 
tax credit for renewable energy was, until relatively recently, renewed on an annual or 
biannual basis, leaving the industry unsure of whether the subsidies would be available in 
the future. See id. at 1127–28. The threat of additional regulation of greenhouse gas emis-
sions has hung over the coal-fired power industry for more than a decade now, posing a 
risk that the cost of generating electric power from coal will increase significantly in the 
years to come. Future natural gas prices in the United States depend in part on the avail-
ability of ample supplies of gas trapped in shale deposits. The process of producing gas 
from those deposits—called “hydraulic fracturing” —has provoked local opposition, a ban 
on drilling in parts of New York State, and a U.S. EPA study aimed at determining whether 
additional regulation is warranted. See EPA, Office of Research & Development, Hy-
draulic Fracturing Research Study 1–2 (2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/ow 
indian/tribal/pdf/hydraulic-fracturing-fact-sheet.pdf. 
328 See Hannah Choi Granade et al., McKinsey & Co., Unlocking Energy Effi-
ciency in the U.S. Economy 91 (2009), available at http://www.mckinsey.com/Client_Ser- 
vice/Electric_Power_and_Natural_Gas/Latest_thinking/Unlocking_energy_efficiency_in_ 
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All of this uncertainty can make it exceptionally difficult for a prospec-
tive developer of a new generating plant to estimate future project rev-
enues. The prospective generator may face the prospect of selling all of 
its energy in a spot market, and may be cost-competitive in that market 
only during periods of peak demand. In that case, it may need peak 
rates to be higher than the FERC-imposed mitigation rate cap, even if 
that cap provides excessive scarcity rents to existing sellers. 
 Thus, it is unreasonable to assume that high electricity prices will 
invite entry. To the contrary, wholesale sellers may be able to sustain 
market power and capture scarcity rents for extended periods of time. 
In the words of former FERC Chairman William Massey: 
[A] spot market reflecting short-term marginal energy prices, 
coupled with inelastic supply and demand, may not send the 
correct price signals in time to motivate new entry of capacity 
resources at the time they are needed . . . . [E]conomic theory 
suggests that sufficient generation capacity would develop to 
meet a market-based reliability standard if . . . prices were able 
to fluctuate freely and if demand were able to see and re-
spond to wholesale prices. However, these conditions for an 
efficient level of generation are not present in the current 
markets and probably not in the foreseeable future in newly-
formed markets.329 
If FERC’s only solution to this problem is to mitigate market power af-
ter it detects it—that is, to impose price caps that are set at levels de-
signed to, but which do not actually, invite entry—this means that con-
sumers may be stuck paying prices considerably in excess of competitive 
levels for extended periods of time.330 
 For example, in 2008, the FERC Office of Enforcement investi-
gated the potential abuse of market power in the New York City capac-
ity market,331 after complaints by buyers in that market that some of the 
sellers of capacity were engaging in economic withholding (strategic 
bidding to raise the market clearing price).332 In its report on the inves-
                                                                                                                      
 
the_US_economy.aspx (to access full report, click “Read full report (PDF-6.37 MB)” hyper-
link below report summary). 
329 William L. Massey, Robert S. Fleishman & Mary J. Doyle, Reliability-Based Competition 
in Wholesale Electricity: Legal and Policy Perspectives, 25 Energy L.J. 319, 348 (2004). 
330 It has been called “a political reality” that “energy prices will not be allowed to 
reach the levels that are necessary for resource adequacy.” Id. at 349. 
331 See supra note 180 for a description of capacity markets. 
332 FERC, Staff Report: Findings of a Non-Public Investigation of Potential 
Market Manipulation by Suppliers in the New York City Capacity Market 2 (2008), 
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tigation, the Commission staff rejected these complaints, but noted 
that: (1) some sellers in the New York City market had market power 
and operated under a FERC-imposed bidding cap; (2) despite setting 
the price at a level intended to invite entry, entry had not occurred in 
the market; and (3) as a consequence, sellers who were subject to rate 
caps consistently offered their capacity at those caps, and sellers not 
subject to caps offered their capacity into the market at rates exceeding 
the cap.333 Noting that the investigation was governed by FERC’s Order 
670 anti-manipulation rules, the report stated that “[e]conomic with-
holding . . . is not a per se violation” of those rules; moreover, the bid-
ding behavior observed in the New York City capacity market was con-
sistent with those rules because enforcement staff found no evidence 
that that bidding behavior “involved fraud or deception and, therefore, 
constituted market manipulation.”334 
 This kind of situation is not what proponents of energy markets 
envisioned, but it reflects the agency’s belief that, with the appropriate 
fine tuning, markets will prevail in the long run.335 Although faith in 
markets seems to have prevailed at FERC, it did so over the objections 
of some economists and legal scholars who foresaw some of the current 
problems we are experiencing in energy markets.336 In particular, 
                                                                                                                      
available at http://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-reports.asp (select “Electric” tab to access hy-
perlink to report). 
333 Id. at 2–16. 
334 Id. at 15–17. 
335 Some organized electricity spot markets—those overseen by ISOs and RTOs—
address this problem by using automatic mitigation procedures that reduce offer prices 
from the generators whose prices violate certain criteria. For an analysis of the automatic 
mitigation procedure used in New York State ISO markets, see Daniel L. Shawhan et al., 
An Experimental Test of Automatic Mitigation of Wholesale Electricity Prices, 29 Int’l. J. Ind. Org. 
46, 52 (2011), which concludes that, in conditions of high market power, automatic miti-
gation procedures “did not keep electricity prices nearly as close to marginal cost as [they] 
did . . . under [low market power conditions],” and also suggests that, irrespective of prob-
lems in New York City’s capacity markets, automatic mitigation may minimize the effects of 
market power in New York City’s electricity spot markets. Under Order 719, FERC requires 
ISOs and RTOs to employ mitigation procedures in spot markets, though not necessarily 
the kind of mitigation used by the New York ISO. See, e.g., Midwest Indep. Transmission 
Sys. Operator, Inc., 127 F.E.R.C. ¶¶ 61,054, 61,273 (2009) (Order on Rehearing & Com-
pliance) (requiring Midwest ISO to impose mitigation and finding that its “proposal to 
simply refer potential exercises of market power to the Commission” is inconsistent with 
Order 719). 
336 Indeed, the economic argument for deregulation was based on a comparison of 
competition and public utility regulation that employed much more generous assumptions 
about the former (e.g., that markets will tend toward perfect competition, the absence of 
transaction costs in bargaining, etc.) than the latter (e.g., that the policy process was prone 
to corruption and inefficiency). See, e.g., Victor P. Goldberg, Regulation and Administered 
Contracts, 7 Bell J. Econ. 426, 427 (1976). 
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transaction cost economics and industrial organization scholarship of-
fer insights into possible problems associated with disaggregating pub-
lic utility functions. For example, when a firm’s assets are constructed 
at a particular location for a particular purpose (the problem of “asset 
specificity”), that firm faces the risk that its contractual counterparties 
(those from whom it buys or to whom it sells) will act opportunistically, 
taking advantage of the firm’s lack of alternative options to “hold up” 
the firm on price.337 In electricity markets, virtually all of the partici-
pants’ investments are characterized by some degree of asset specificity: 
neither demand nor supply is geographically mobile. In these situa-
tions, it might be dangerous to assume that arms-length transactions in 
the market (such as spot markets) will produce more efficient out-
comes than vertical integration would have. Noting that asset specificity 
was the norm in the electricity industry, one author argued prior to re-
structuring that reliance on anonymous spot market transactions to 
supply electricity is likely to fail “because the sinking of relationship-
specific investments transforms a large-numbers bargaining situation ex 
ante into a small-numbers bargaining situation ex post,” creating op-
portunities for buyers or sellers to extract rents from the other and 
consequent disincentives to invest in capacity.338 In other words, there 
are good reasons to expect (1) that individual electricity suppliers in 
wholesale spot markets will be able to exert market power, even when 
there are many sellers, and (2) that this situation can persist for extended 
periods of time. This is not merely of historical interest: increasing per-
centages of wholesale sales of American energy currently occur on spot 
markets.339 
                                                                                                                      
 
337 The Nature of the Firm, supra note 323, at 42–43; Paul L. Joskow, Asset Specificity and 
the Structure of Vertical Relationships: An Empirical Evidence, in The Nature of the Firm, supra 
note 323, at 117, 121–22. See generally Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford & Armen A. Al-
chian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J. Law & 
Econ. 297 (1978) (noting the particular trouble asset specificity poses for spot markets). 
338 Joskow, supra note 337, at 123–25; see also Pirrong, supra note 315, at 5 (noting that 
in an illiquid market, individual traders may be able to persistently—even permanently—
affect price). Indeed, one author excludes electricity markets from an analysis of market 
power, because “[d]etecting, and hence deterring, manipulation in electricity markets is 
far more difficult” because electricity cannot be stored. Pirrong, supra note 315, at 8 n.15. 
See generally Jim Rossi, The Common Law “Duty to Serve” and Protection of Consumers in an Age of 
Competitive Retail Public Utility Restructuring, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1233 (1998) (discussing risks 
to consumer protection posed by restructuring and advocating various measures to miti-
gate those risks). 
339 See Ezra Hausman, Rick Hornby & Allison Smith, Synapse Energy Econ., Inc., 
Bilateral Contracting in Deregulated Electricity Markets: A Report to the 
American Public Power Association 1–3 (2008), available at http://www.publicpower. 
org/files/PDFs/EMRISynapseBilateralsReport2008.pdf (noting that over reliance on spot 
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 Certainly, this kind of sustained supra-competitive pricing may be 
permissible under modern economic thinking, but like much of mod-
ern antitrust policy,340 it is almost certainly inconsistent with Congress’s 
intentions in enacting the antitrust laws. Economists are concerned 
primarily with the allocative inefficiency of monopoly. That is, they con-
sider monopolies to be inefficient not because the move from competi-
tion to monopoly produces transfers of surplus from consumers to pro-
ducers,341 but rather because it produces a “deadweight loss” —potential 
social value that is captured neither by the producer nor the consumer.342 
Yet, when members of Congress sought to restrict monopoly through 
antitrust and public utility statutes, they were responding to constitu-
ents’ preferences, few if any of which had much to do with allocative 
efficiency.343 Indeed, antitrust and public utility legislation in the United 
States was motivated by distributive questions, such as voters’ fears of 
exploitation by monopolies and popular opposition to the higher prices 
                                                                                                                      
markets “has resulted in windfall profits for owners of existing generation”). Nor are long-
term contracts a perfect solution to this problem. Long-term supply contracts can act as 
barriers to entry for prospective sellers of energy; indeed, the European Commission’s 
efforts to create competitive energy markets have focused on long-term supply contracts as 
barriers to entry. For a discussion of these issues in a transaction cost economics context, 
see generally Giuseppe Bellantuono, Contract Law, Regulation and Competition in Energy Mar-
kets, 10 Competition & Regulation in Network Industries 159 (2009). 
340 One author contends that modern antitrust jurisprudence has become almost en-
tirely divorced from the intent of the legislatures that enacted the Sherman Act, the Clay-
ton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act. Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Anti-
trust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice 59–60 (1985). 
341 See, e.g., Terry Calvani & John Siegfried, Economic Analysis and Antitrust 
Law 6 (2d ed. 1988) (arguing that “transfer payment[s] from consumers to producers in 
the form of higher prices and higher profits is not the concern of the efficiency but of 
equity . . . [and] economics has little to say about who ‘deserves’ the payment”). But cf. 
Richard Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective 8–18 (1976) (arguing that 
economic analysis ought not treat the transfer of wealth from consumer to producer as 
costless to society because businesses will engage in socially wasteful spending in order to 
secure monopoly profits). 
342 See Calvani & Siegfried, supra note 341, at 25–28; Hovenkamp, supra note 340, at 
18–20; Varian, supra note 12, at 447–51; see also Geoffrey Rothwell & Tomás Gómez, 
Electricity Economics: Regulation and Deregulation 30–32 (2003). 
343 “The concepts of allocative efficiency and deadweight loss from monopoly were al-
most certainly not known to the framers of the Sherman Act . . . [and] only a few state-
ments in the debates leading up to the Sherman Act sound even remotely like efficiency 
arguments, and even these are ambiguous.” Hovenkamp, supra note 340, at 49–50. Indeed, 
it had previously been argued that economic thinking at the time was opposed to the pas-
sage of the Sherman Act because most economists believed that large enterprises were 
more efficient. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law: 1836–1937, at 
308–15 (1991). 
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and lower quantities associated with monopoly production.344 Indeed, 
natural gas and electricity markets are partially insulated from direct 
antitrust regulation precisely because FERC is charged with regulating 
those markets so as to maintain just and reasonable prices.345 One might 
argue, then, that as FERC gives energy markets a freer hand, electricity 
and natural gas markets ought to be subject to the full range of antitrust 
rules and remedies as are oil markets.346 
2. Consistency with FPA and NGA 
 The discussion above suggests a question: if supra-competitive 
prices are a sustained feature of some energy markets, are those prices 
“just and reasonable” (as is required) under the FPA and NGA? Both 
the FPA and the NGA were enacted during a time when cost-of-service 
rate regulation was the norm. On one hand, it is probably reasonable 
to infer that members of Congress expected the Federal Power Com-
mission, the predecessor of FERC, to set wholesale rates using that me-
thod, and thereby to protect buyers from high prices.347 On the other 
                                                                                                                      
 
344 See, e.g., Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Anti-
trust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 Hastings L.J. 65, 93–96 (1982); Louis B. 
Schwartz, “Justice” and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1076, 1076 
(1979). But see Robert Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J. Law & 
Econ. 7, 7 (1966) (concluding that “Congress intended the courts to implement . . . only 
that value we would today call consumer welfare”). Still others argue that the antitrust 
statutes were designed simply to protect small business, regardless of efficiency or other 
concerns. See, e.g., Jack Blicksilver, Defenders and Defense of Big Business in the 
United States, 1880–1900, at 122–128 (1985); Hovenkamp, supra note 340, at 247; Terry 
Calvani, Consumer Welfare Is Prime Objective of Antitrust, Legal Times, Dec. 24/31, 1984, at 
14, 18–22 (quoting opinions to that effect from Judge Learned Hand and Justice William 
O. Douglas). 
345 For further discussion of this issue, see supra note 322 and accompanying text and 
infra notes 347–360 and accompanying text. 
346 See, e.g., Robert B. Martin, III, Sherman Shorts Out: The Dimming of Antitrust Enforce-
ment in the California Electricity Crisis, 55 Hastings L.J. 271, 300 (2003) (arguing that the 
filed rate doctrine is a poor fit for the newly competitive energy markets); see also Nor-
lander, supra note 97, at 88; Jacqueline Lang Weaver, Can Energy Markets Be Trusted? The 
Effect of the Rise and Fall of Enron on Energy Markets, 4 Hous. Bus. & Tax L.J. 1, 6–25 (2004). 
347 The Supreme Court has said that the primary aim of the NGA was to 
protect consumers against exploitation at the hands of natural gas companies 
. . . . Moreover, the investigations of the Federal Trade Commission had dis-
closed that the majority of the pipeline mileage in the country used to trans-
port natural gas, together with an increasing percentage of the natural gas 
supply for pipe-line transportation, had been acquired by a handful of hold-
ing companies. State commissions, independent producers, and communities 
having or seeking the service were growing quite helpless against these com-
binations. 
198 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:131 
hand, buyers on wholesale markets are typically sophisticated parties, 
and both the FPA and NGA regimes have long contemplated bilateral 
contracts for wholesale sales of energy at freely negotiated rates.348 Fur-
thermore, there is well-established case precedent under both statutes 
for the proposition that FERC has discretion in the particular methods 
it uses to establish just and reasonable rates.349 Does that mean that the 
current regime, under which sellers can charge market rates on fluctu-
ating spot markets subject to FERC oversight, is consistent with the FPA 
and NGA? 
 FERC believes that the answer to this question is “yes,” and that this 
issue has been resolved by the courts. Indeed, in a 2006 decision, Cali-
fornia ex rel. Lockyer v. FERC, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit did conclude that market-based rates satisfy the FPA’s “just and rea-
sonable” standard.350 Two earlier Supreme Court decisions from the 
1990s, addressing attempts by regulators to move toward market-based 
rates (outside of the energy industry), cast doubt on that conclusion. In 
1990, in Maislin Industries, U.S. v. Primary Steel, Inc., the Court overturned 
the ICC’s decision to allow negotiated (rather than regulated) rates for 
certain trucking services.351 In 1994, in MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. 
AT&T, the Court struck down an attempt by the Federal Communica-
tions Commission (FCC) to stimulate competition by waiving the filing 
requirement for long-distance rates charged by long-distance carriers 
who lacked market power.352 In both cases, the Court found that the 
agency’s removal of regulatory requirements in order to stimulate com-
petition was inconsistent with the statutory scheme. 
 In Lockyer, the Ninth Circuit faced the questions of whether mar-
ket-based rates for electricity charged by wholesale sellers in the dys-
functional California electricity spot markets of 2000–2001 were (1) 
“just and reasonable” under the FPA, and (2) protected by the filed rate 
doctrine. The case was an appeal from a FERC decision answering both 
questions in the affirmative and concluded that FERC had no power to 
                                                                                                                      
Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 610–11 (1944) (citations omit-
ted). 
348 Indeed, the so-called “Mobile-Sierra” doctrine stands for the proposition that freely 
negotiated rates are presumed to be just and reasonable under both the FPA and NGA. 
For more on this doctrine, see infra note 356 and accompanying text. 
349 See Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 611–14 (holding that rates are just and reasonable 
if they are fair to the parties, irrespective of the method used to calculate them). 
350 383 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th
 
Cir. 2004); see also La. Energy & Power Auth. v. FERC, 141 
F.3d 364, 365 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (approving market based rates). 
351 497 U.S. 116, 134–36 (1990). 
352 512 U.S. 218, 234 (1994). 
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order refunds as a consequence. The Ninth Circuit distinguished the 
Maislin and MCI cases by noting that, unlike the ICC and the FCC regu-
latory schemes, the FPA contemplates the existence of negotiated, 
market-based rates. Moreover, said the court, FERC conditions its 
grants of power to charge market rates on the absence of market power, 
and monitors markets to regulate the exercise of market power when it 
does arise.353 Specifically, the court concluded that market-based rates 
are filed rates because of the requirement that sellers periodically re-
port information about their sales and market position to FERC; oth-
erwise, failure to report changes in market power by sellers can trigger 
the finding that rates fail to satisfy the “just and reasonable” require-
ment of the FPA, triggering the right to retroactive refunds.354 
 While the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Lockyer case, it 
did review a challenge to long-term wholesale power purchase contracts 
entered into by several wholesale buyers in western power markets 
shortly after the collapse of California’s electricity markets discussed in 
the 2008 case of Morgan Stanley Capital Group, Inc. v. P.U.D. No. 1 of Sno-
homish County.355 The Morgan Stanley Court concluded that the con-
tracts at issue were protected from judicial challenge by the “Mobile-
Sierra doctrine,” which requires FERC to presume that freely negoti-
ated contract rates satisfy the “just and reasonable” standard under 
both the FPA and the NGA.356 
                                                                                                                     
 While all of this suggests that courts see FERC’s approach to mar-
ket-based pricing as consistent with the FPA and NGA regulatory re-
gimes, there remains room for doubt. The Morgan Stanley holding con-
firmed only the validity of long-term contract rates negotiated between 
sophisticated parties, a principle that was well-established under both 
the FPA and NGA prior to restructuring and market-based pricing. The 
Supreme Court has never addressed the question of whether spot mar-
ket rates are protected by the filed rate doctrine or consistent with the 
 
353 Lockyer, 383 F.3d at 1013. For a more detailed description of how FERC monitors 
markets in this way, see supra notes 167–180 and accompanying text. 
354 Lockyer, 383 F.3d at 1013. Indeed, since 2001, FERC has conditioned its grants of 
market-based rate making authority on the right to order retroactive refunds. See Order 
Establishing Refund Effective Date and Proposing to Revise Market-Based Rate Tariffs and 
Authorizations, Docket No. EL01-118-00, 97 F.E.R.C. ¶¶ 61,220, 61,975 (Nov. 20, 2001). 
355 554 U.S. 527, 530 (2008). 
356 Id. at 530, 553–55. For additional support for this view, see generally Michael J. 
Gergen, George D. Cannon, Jr. & David G. Tewksbury, Market-Based Ratemaking and the 
Western Energy Crisis of 2000 and 2001, 24 Energy L.J. 321 (2003). For a conflicting view, see 
generally Norlander, supra note 97 (questioning the legal basis of FERC’s market-based 
ratemaking initiative and concluding that it conflicts with FERC’s statutory duty under 
Section 206 of the FPA). 
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FPA or NGA. Indeed, opponents of market-based rates can cling to an 
argument drawn from Justice Antonin Scalia’s words in the Maislin, 
AT&T, and Morgan Stanley opinions. In Maislin, Justice Scalia’s concur-
ring opinion noted that “deregulation” must be accomplished within 
the “framework of the existing statutory scheme,” and that if Congress 
wants the kind of deregulation the ICC is proposing, that choice is 
Congress’s—not the ICC’s—to make.357 In MCI, Justice Scalia’s majority 
opinion notes that the FCC’s attempts to stimulate competition by waiv-
ing filing requirements “may be a good idea, but it was not the idea 
Congress enacted into law in 1934.”358 Most importantly, in Morgan 
Stanley, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion goes out of its way to note that 
the Court specifically declined to rule on the question of whether mar-
ket-based rates are consistent with the FPA, stating at the outset of the 
opinion that “[w]e have not hitherto approved, and express no opinion 
today, on the lawfulness of the market-based-tariff system.”359 Later in 
the opinion, he adds, “We reiterate that we do not address the lawful-
ness of FERC’s market-based-rates scheme, which assuredly has its crit-
ics. But any needed revision in that scheme is properly addressed in a 
challenge to the scheme itself, not through a disfigurement of the ven-
erable Mobile-Sierra doctrine.”360 For opponents of market-based rates, 
this language offers hope. To the extent that this remains an open 
question, there is an argument that the “just and reasonable” language 
in both the FPA and the NGA signifies Congressional intent to protect 
consumers against the kind of supra-competitive prices that can arise in 
energy markets. 
Conclusion 
 Watching regulators grapple with the problem of market power in 
energy markets, one is reminded of an old joke about the economist 
who, while walking along a busy city sidewalk, passes by a one-hundred 
dollar bill lying on the ground. When asked by his friend why he did 
not pick up the bill, the economist responds, “That cannot be [a $100 
bill]. If there were actually a $100 bill, someone would have picked it 
up.”361 Modern energy regulators sometimes seem to employ similarly 
                                                                                                                      
357 Maislin, 497 U.S. at 138 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
358 MCI, 512 U.S. at 231–34. 
359 554 U.S. at 538. 
360 Id. at 548. 
361 The origins of this joke are unknown. For a version of it, however, see Funny Econo-
mists Jokes, Workjoke: Profession Jokes, http://www.workjoke.com/economists-jokes.html 
(last visited Dec. 2, 2011). 
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unrealistic assumptions about the way energy markets work. Energy 
markets are more competitive than ever before, yet they do not behave 
the way economic models suggest they should. 
 Changing conditions in the oil industry, and the move from public 
utility regulation to competition and market-based pricing in the natu-
ral gas and electricity industries has increased the risk that powerful 
actors in those markets will use market power to extract rents at the 
expense of consumers. Believing in the benefits of competition, regula-
tors have tried to guard against that risk by monitoring markets and 
providing participants in those markets with the tools to protect them-
selves against price risk—tools such as energy derivatives. The relation-
ship between physical markets for energy and energy derivatives mar-
kets, however, has created new opportunities for manipulation for savvy 
market participants. In a partial attempt to limit those opportunities, 
regulators have turned to the tools of the securities laws, regulating 
competition in energy and energy derivatives markets by proscribing 
manipulation and deceit. 
 This regulatory approach is new to energy markets. The regulators 
charged with implementing it (particularly the CFTC and FERC) seem 
inclined to follow the lead of securities regulators by focusing their en-
forcement attention on actors who use deceptive methods, while taking 
a gentler attitude toward the capture of scarcity rents by sellers who ac-
quire market power without using deception. In securities regulation, 
this focus reflects the importance of information and deception in se-
curities markets. In energy regulation, by contrast, the ability to extract 
rents depends more upon the capture of market power than upon de-
ception or misleading others. Presumably, however, energy regulators 
are reticent about punishing the mere exercise of market power in en-
ergy markets, because they fear that doing so will discourage entry; cor-
respondingly, they assume that high prices will invite entry and encour-
age consumption. Unfortunately, in some energy markets (particularly 
electricity markets), participants do not respond to price signals in pre-
dictable ways. 
 Ironically, then, this new approach to regulation may simultane-
ously permit the exercise of market power and insulate supra-
competitive prices from challenges based upon traditional public utility 
law or antitrust law principles. This is not only an irony, but also a tri-
umph of dynamic statutory interpretation. Both the public utility stat-
utes and the antitrust statutes were designed to limit the exercise of 
market power in energy markets yet, in modern energy regulation and 
jurisprudence, these original statutory objectives have been overtaken 
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by modern economic thinking about the costs and benefits of market 
power, and ways to address those costs and benefits. 
 Of course, modern American energy markets are still evolving, and 
regulators are evolving along with them, if usually a step or two behind. 
It is possible that these efforts will eventually bear fruit, that regulators 
will find better ways to identify and deter market power, and that en-
ergy markets will begin to behave in ways that are consistent with tradi-
tional economic expectations. Perhaps new limits on the use of energy 
derivatives imposed by the 2010 Dodd-Frank law will make energy de-
rivatives markets more responsive to market fundamentals and less vo-
latile. Perhaps the CFTC will decide to use its already-existing authority 
more aggressively to punish attempts to corner energy markets in the 
absence of deception. Perhaps FERC’s market monitoring and mitiga-
tion efforts will grow more effective over time.362 Perhaps courts will 
find more ways to punish egregious examples of naked market power 
manipulation in energy markets (as they have in securities markets), by 
inferring or imputing the presence of deception in those cases. 
 In any case, it seems unlikely that politicians and regulators will 
permit poorly functioning markets to persist for very long. It is often 
said that energy is the lifeblood of the economy,363 and consumers will 
not tolerate high energy prices for sustained periods of time. At some 
point, politicians or FERC may lose faith in the ability of market-based 
rates to satisfy the “just and reasonable” standard in natural gas and/or 
electricity markets, or in the ability of hedgers to use derivatives to pro-
tect consumers against high prices and price volatility. For the immedi-
ate future, however, it seems that the CFTC and FERC plan on continu-
ing to take a relatively light-handed approach to the problem of market 
power in energy markets. 
 
362 The automatic mitigation procedures employed by NYISO, described supra note 
180, may represent just this kind of regulatory learning or adaptation. 
363 See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 226 n.59 (1940) (de-
scribing the oil price fixing arrangements at issue there as a “threat to the central nervous 
system of the economy.”); Amory B. Lovins, DOD’s Energy Challenge as Strategic Opportunity, 
57 Joint Force Q. 33, 33 (2010), available at http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-
57/lovins.pdf (“Energy is the lifeblood of modern societies and a pillar of America’s prow-
ess and prosperity.”); Kathleen A. McGinty, Sec’y of the Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. for the Com-
monwealth of Pa., Keynote Address at the Widener Law Journal Symposium, Facing Cli-
mate Change: Tools and Opportunities for Pennsylvania (Mar. 25, 2004), in 14 Widener 
L.J. 11, 18 (2004) (“Energy, as you know, is the lifeblood of our entire economy.”). 
